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1 Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have 
waged war on constitutional tort lawsuits. 1 The playing field is motion prac-
1. See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S. C § 1983: Interpretive Approach 
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 497, 549 (1992) (contending that 
Supreme Court's qualified immunity standard overly protects governmental officials and is 
inconsistent with Congress's intent); Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity 
in the Age ofConstitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWAL.REv. 261,268-69 (1995) (arguing that 
Supreme Court's use of open-ended standard for qualified immunity allows judges to apply 
qualified immunity in "arbitrary or biased ways" against plaintiffs); Kit Kin ports, Habeas Corpus, 
Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARiz. 
L. REv. 115, 116 (1991) (contending that federal courts' "actual application [of the qualified 
immunity defense] in many cases is completely unjustified by any relevant policy consideration"); 
Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 
1719, 1720 (1989) (arguing that Supreme Court has used tort rhetoric to "limit the scope of 
§ 1983" civil rights actions); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 
27 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L.REv. 465,501 (1992) (stating that "[a]slongasthecourtsand both federal 
and state government treat police abuse as a series of isolated incidents, or as a regrettable by-
product of the war on crime, the Monroes, Rafts and Rodney Kings will continue to pay an 
unconscionable price for our misguided policies"); Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes 
a Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence 
& Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1085, 1106 (1994) (contending that appellate courts' 
adoption ofheightened pleading standard for constitutional tort actions might encourage officials 
to disregard constitutional rights because plaintiffs would lose lawsuits under that standard); 
Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police 
Misconduct, 1993 UTAHL.REv. 149,203 (1993) (stating that "the full potential of[ constitutional 
tort] remedies has been crippled by overly restric;:tive judicial rulings and statutes that are 
unresponsive to social change"); Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 
U.S.C § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1993) 
(contending that Supreme Court's interpretation of§ 1983 has made lawsuits for plaintiffs almost 
impossible to win against police officers who have violated the Constitution); Clay J. Pierce, 
Note, The Misapplication ofQualifiedimmunity: Unfair Procedural Burdens for Constitutional 
Damage Claims Requiring Proof of the Defendant's Intent, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1769, 1772 
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tice, not the courtroom? Today, the fluny of pretrial motions engulfs the appel-
late courts,3 not just the district courts. In the appellate courts, officials have 
asserted, before a trial has occurred4 and sometimes even before discovery,5 
qualified immunity from paying damages for alleged constitutional violations. 
In deciding these pretrial appeals, appellate courts have assumed powers that 
they do not have. They have granted governmental officials qualified immunity 
by discardingjurisdictionallimitations,6 rewriting the Federal Rules of Civil 
(1994) (arguing that "courts are not justified in increasing procedural burdens beyond the levels 
normally required under the Federal Rules"). 
2. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct 1636, 1651 (1997)(statingthat"[m]ostfrivolous 
and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little 
if any personal involvement by the defendant"); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's 
Manual, 26 IND. L. REv. 187, 206-07 (1993) (contending that procedural aspects of qualified 
immunity defense have confused courts and practitioners); David Rudovsky, The Qualified 
Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicia/Activism and the Restriction ofConstitutional. 
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 67 (1989) (stating that "as the [Supreme] Court has shaped and 
reshaped the substantive elements of the [qualified immunity] defense, it has had to adjust the 
procedural rules that control civil rights actions"); Stephen I. Shapiro, Public Officials' Qualified 
Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Its Progeny: A Critical 
Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 253-54 (1989) (arguing that procedural unfairness of 
qualified immunity defense requires statutory reform for civil rights actions). 
3. 15ACHARLESALANWRIGHTEfAL.,FEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE§ 3914.10 
n.92 (Supp. 1997) (stating that during three-year study ofinterlocutory appeals, appellate courts 
reversed district court orders denying official immunity in more than 70% of cases). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 138-7 4, 183-241 for discussion of these interlocu-
tory appeals. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 138-70, 183-85, 187-234 for discussion of these 
interlocutory appeals. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 9, 179-85, 220-21,235-41. To illustrate, under 
Johnson v. Jones, appellate courts do not have jurisdiction during an interlocutory appeal to 
consider whether the district court properly determined that the material facts were in dispute. 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, 
appellate courts have nevertheless asserted jurisdiction over that very issue. See Turner v. Scott, 
119 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 1997). The issue in Turner was whether the-defendant, a police 
officer, had known of another officer's abusive behavior in hitting the plaintiff with a gun. I d. 
The district court decided that the plaintiffhad presented sufficient evidence for the issue to go 
to the jury. I d. The Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity, stating that "there is not a scintilla 
of evidence linking Officer Scott to the harm." Id at 430; see also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 
640, 642-44 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2512 (1997). In Elliott, police officers 
arrested the plaintiff-decedent for driving while intoxicated. I d. at 641. They handcuffed him 
and put him in their cruiser. I d. The officers contended that their 22 shots at the plaintiff-
decedent were justified because he appeared to point a gun at him, even though they had just 
finished searching him. Id. at 642. With the suspect now dead, the only surviving witnesses 
were the police officers. The district court denied summary judgment because material facts were 
in dispute. Id at 644. Despite Johnson, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "As to the 
material facts here, there is no genuine dispute because the plaintiff has come forward with no 
evidence." Id. Ruling on the merits, the Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiff had failed 
to prove a constitutional violation. I d. 
' 
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Procedure7 and ignoring institutional restraints. 8 Appellate courts have robbed 
Some courts have also erroneously asserted jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiffhas 
stated a claim even if such a review requires sifting and weighing the facts the district court found 
sufficiently supported. See Sanderferv. Nichols, 62 F .3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1995). In Sanderfer, 
a prisoner alleged that prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" to her serious medical needs, 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. The district court ruled that she had demonstrated 
sufficient evidence to create a material fact as to whether the officials were deliberately 
indifferent. !d. The Sixth Circuit asserted jurisdiction and held that in viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had established at most negligence, not 
deliberate indifference. Id at 155. The appellate court thus considered the sufficiency of the 
evidence, yet explained that it could do so because it was determining the question of whether 
the plaintiff had stated a constitutional violation. !d. at 153 n.2; see also Edwards v. Giles, 51 
F.3d 155 (8th Cir. 1995). In Edwards, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 
It held that the plaintiff's affidavit alleging that police officers used excessive force did not 
provide enough detail as to how the force was unreasonable. !d. at 157. The plaintiffhad alleged 
that during the arrest he was not belligerent and that the officers had unreasonably thrown him 
to the ground, injuring him. !d. In contrast, the district court had found material facts in dispute 
and denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. at 156. 
In addition, some courts have unnecessarily expanded their jurisdiction in qualified 
immunity appeals by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence question by using the doctrine 
of pendent appellate jurisdiction. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 143-58 for a discussion of how appellate courts 
have ignored procedural limitations. To illustrate, some courts have granted qualified immunity 
on summary judgment by erroneously deciding disputed material facts, in violation of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) (s~ting that summary judgment is proper if material facts are not 
in dispute and party is entitled to judgment as matter of law). See, e.g., Lennon v. Miller, 66 
F.3d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1995). In Lennon, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared that 
there were no material facts in dispute and granted qualified immunity to a police officer who 
had allegedly used unreasonable force in "yank[ing]" a suspect out of a car. Id at 426. Either 
the court decided that the yank was not too forceful, a factual issue, or it created a per se right 
for officers to use whatever force is necessary to get a citizen out of a car. Wilson v. Meeks, 52 
F.3d 1547, 1556 {lOth Cir. 1995). In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved 
disputed material facts in order to grant a police officer qualified immunity for his failure to 
prevent the plaintiff's death. !d. The plaintiff was a suspect, who died either of positional 
asphyxiation by lying on his stomach with his wrists secured in handcuffs or by suffocation from 
the "inspiration ofblood, dirt, and vomit." !d. at 1550. The plaintiff-decedent alleged that police 
officers were deliberately indifferentto his serious medical needs. !d. at 1549. The district court 
ruled that there were disputed issues of material facts that made deciding the immunity question 
impossible. Id. An officer had refused to take off the handcuffs when requested to do so by a 
medical technician because the suspect was too bloody. Id. at 1550. The appellate court held 
that the refusal did not evidence deliberate indifference and granted qualified immunity to the 
arresting officers. Id. at 1556; see also Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960,965 (4th Cir. 
1992) (en bane). In Gooden, a majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously 
granted qualified immunity for officials for an unlawful arrest on summary judgment by resolving 
material disputed facts. Id. at 964. Although the facts are detailed, the heart of the conflict 
centered on whether police officers reasonably believed that the plaintiff was a danger to herself 
and should be arrested. Id. at 963-64. They had heard hollering in one of the apartments and 
investigated. Id. at 962-63. The plaintiff responded to their inquiries by stating that she had 
been ironing clothes and burned herself. Id. According to the plaintiff, she showed the officers 
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constitutionally injured citizens of their day in court by granting motions for 
dismissal9 and summazy judgment10when the appellate courts lack jurisdiction. 
the hot iron, clothes, and the bum mark. /d. at 963. In direct contrast, the officers stated that 
the iron was cold and that there were no clothes or bum mark. /d. at 962-63. When they left 
they heard more shouting by a male and a female, but not in response to each other. /d. at 963. 
Assuming that the plaintiff had multiple personalities, they arrested her. /d. at 963-64. The 
plaintiff argued that she told them that she had been on the telephone talking. /d. at 963. The 
Fourth Circuit clearly believed the officers' version of what happened. !d. at 965-66. 
Courts have also imposed a heightened pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs, in 
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See F.R. Crv. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that 
plaintiff need only provide "short and plain statement of the claim"); see also Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. 1996) (en bane), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997) (reviewing 
whether District Court for the District of Columbia properly interpreted the qualified immunity 
defense as requiring plaintiff to meet a "clear and convincing" evidence standard for First 
Amendment claim raising unconstitutional intent). See, e.g., 1AMARTINF. SCHWARTZ&Jmm 
E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.6, at 19 {3d ed. 1997) {stating 
that courts of appeals have all required plaintiffs to plead "specific factual allegations demon-
strating a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law"). 
One court has also by judicial interpretation "amended" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
7(a) by suggesting that district courts must order plaintiffs to issue a reply to an official's answer 
when the answer raises the qualified immunity defense. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 
1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en bane) (stating that "[v]indicatingthe immunity doctrine will ordinarily 
require such a reply, and district court's discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when greater 
detail might assist"); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 7(a) (stating that court has discretion to "order a 
reply to an answer"). 
8. The Supreme Court has specifically and erroneously authorized appellate courts to 
"find" facts when officials appeal from an order denying summary judgment in which the district 
court failed to specify the material disputed facts. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 
(1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995). For a discussion of the appellate courts' 
proper role during appeals from these orders, see infra p. 44. 
In response to Behrens and Johnson, many appellate courts have run wild with the new 
freedom to canvass the record. Some have "supplemented" the district court's articulated, 
assumed facts. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996)(stating that 
"we will begin with the facts found by the district court and supplement them only where 
necessary to determine if summary judgment should have been granted after proper application 
of the law to the facts"). Some have found "discretion" to accept, the district court's assumed 
facts. See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1563 (11th Cir.), amended by 101 F.3d 
1363 {11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2514 (1997). And some, in clear violation of 
Johnson, have explicitly rejected the district court's assumed facts, determining that the district 
court improperly evaluated the evidence. See, e.g., Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th 
Cir. 1995). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 183-86 for discussion of why jurisdiction does not 
exist for these interlocutory appeals. During interlocutory appeals from motions to dismiss, some 
courts determine that the plaintiff has not stated claim and dismiss the lawsuit. See, e.g., Doe 
v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1414 (5th Cir. 1997) (en bane) {holding that 
plaintiffwho had allegedly been raped by school custodian did not state constitutional violation). 
Some appellate courts dismiss suits because the complaint did not state a violation of clearly 
established law. See, e.g., Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1183 n.4 (11th Cir. 
1997) (plaintiff's alleged First Amendment rights were not clearly established); Foster v. City 
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The appellate courts have misread the qualified immunity standard articu-
lated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald11 as granting appellate courts the power to change 
procedural rules and expand their jurisdiction. 12 In Harlow, the Supreme Court 
rewrote the qualified immunity standard to eliminate meritless suits as soon 
as procedurally possible.13 To further this purpose, Harlow created an objective 
reasonableness standard for qualified immunity, one that no longer considered 
whether officials acted maliciously .14 Harlow discarded malice as a question 
because it raised a factual issue not capable of resolution in a motion for 
summary judgment. 15 Under the new qualified immunity standard, officials 
had immunity if they acted in accordance with a standard of objective reason-
ableness.16 Courts were to determine objective reasonableness by examining 
case law and considering whether the law was clearly established.17 If officials 
violated clearly established law, then they would not have immunity; if they 
did not, they would have immunity. 18 Harlow also stated that discovery should 
not be allowed until a court determines on summary judgment whether the law 
was "clearly established at the time [the challenged] action occurred."19 
of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 1994). In Foster, the plaintiffs alleged that city 
officials had conspired to deny them their right to access to courts by "concealing and, suppressing 
evidence" during the discovery phase of an automobile accident case that they later settled. !d. 
The Fifth Circuit granted the city officials motion to dismiss, holding that the officials' had 
qualified immunity. Id. at 431. Some appellate courts state that jurisdiction lies to consider 
either, whether the plaintiff has stated a claim and whether the law was clearly established. See, 
e.g., Vaughn v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 82 F.3d 684,685 (6th Cir. 1996). 
In addition to motions for dismissal for failure to state a claim or for failure to allege a 
violation of clearly established law, some courts have also mistakenly asserted jurisdiction from 
orders denying qualified immunity in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Somers 
v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 616 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction for motion for 
judgment on pleadings to grant officials qualified immunity because female prison guards' alleged 
conduct during body cavity search and showering of male plaintiff did not violate clearly 
established law); Praterv. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538,540 (8th Cir. 1996) (findingjurisdiction to grant 
officials' motion for judgment on pleadings where prisoner alleged that officials had failed to 
protect him from inmate they knew to be dangerous). 
10. See infra Part V.B.2. 
11. 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
12. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). For a discussion of Harlow, see 
infra text accompanying notes 56-69. 
13. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-18. 
14. Id. at 815-18. 
15. Id. at 816. 
16. Id. at 818. 
17. !d. 
18. !d. at 818-19. 
19. !d. at 818. Later in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,646 n.6 (1987), the Court 
stated that discovery tailored to the qualified immunity issue would be possible in some circum-
stances. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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In response to this standard, the appellate courts interpreted Harlow as 
creating procedural freedoms capable of protection on appeal.20 The qualified 
immunity standard now had two prongs: a defense-to-liability prong and an 
immunity-from-suitprong.21 The defense-to-liability prong freed officials from 
having to pay damages if they did not violate clearly established rights.22 In 
contrast, the immunity-from-suit prong gave officials procedural freedom from 
participating in unnecessary discovery or trials.23 
Following Harlow, a significant problem emerged: When would appellate 
courts have jurisdiction to immediately review pretrial orders denying qualified 
immunity? Traditionally, federal appellate jurisdiction arises from the final 
judgment statute, which provides that "courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States."24 Yet, when officials assert qualified immunity, the right to an 
immediate appeal nevertheless derives from this statute,25 not from the civil 
rights statute allowing constitutional tort lawsuits against state officials, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,26 nor from the United States Constitution, the source for actions 
against federal officials.27 
Even though the explicit language of the final judgment statute requires 
"final decisions," the Court has declared that some interlocutory appeals under 
this jurisdictional statute are nevertheless "final" because of the judicially 
created "collateral order doctrine. "28 Under this doctrine, nonfinal orders are 
appealable if they fall within "that small class"29 of orders that "[1] conclu-
20. See infra text accompanying notes 83-174. 
21. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 63-76. 
24. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1994). 
25. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. Because the rightto an interlocutory appeal is a procedural 
right, state courts hearing constitutional tort lawsuits are free to follow their own interlocutory 
rules. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct 1800, 1805-06 (1997). Thus, when citizens sue officials 
in state courts that do not provide for interlocutory appeals, qualified immunity is only a defense 
to liability. 
26. But see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (suggesting that this "immunity from suit" came 
qualified immunity defense itself, not§ 1291, final judgment statute). The Mitchell decision 
interpreted the "clearly established" law standard articulated Harlow as recognizing "an entitle-
ment not to stand trial under certain circumstances." Id. 
27. Constitutional tort actions against federal officials are known as Bivens actions because 
of the case that first recognized these lawsuits, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION§ 9.1, at 452-70 (1st ed. 1989) {discussing Bivens and its progeny). 
28. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
29. !d. (quoted with approval in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (plurality 
opinion)). ' 
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sively determine [a] disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [are] effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment. "30 
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyt~1 interpreted the 
qualified immunity defense under these three jurisdictional requirements of 
the collateral order doctrine.32 A plurality of the Mitchell Court determined 
that an interlocutory appeal would protect officials' immunity-from-suit.33 On 
appeal, a court could consider whether the law was clearly established before 
allowing discovery or a trial to proceed. If the law was not clearly established, 
then the official had qualified immunity and thus was not subject either to 
discovery or a trial. 
Since Mitchell, appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
discerned few jurisdictionallimits.l4 Not until ten years after recognizing the 
right to an interlocutory appeal in Mitchell did the Court in Johnson v. Jonesl5 
properly articulate its firstjurisdictionallimitation.36 In Johnson, the Court 
30. Johnson v. Jones, 515U.S. 304,310 (1995)(numberingofelementsby Johnson Court) 
(quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct& Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) 
(bracketednumbersinoriginal)(quotingCoopers&Lybrandv.Livesay,437U.S.463,468(1978)). 
31. 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
32. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (plurality opinion). The number of elements 
in the collateral order doctrine is unclear. In the seminal decision creating this doctrine, Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., the Court also stated that the order should raise a "serious and 
unsettled question." Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547. The Court later specified this as "an additional 
requirement." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 7 42 (1982). Sometimes scholars combine this 
"additional consideration" with the language requiring the issue to be "important" as creating 
a distinct fourth factor. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Hanslick, Comment, Decisions Denying the 
Appointment of Counsel and the Final Judgment Rule in Civil Rights Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 782, 795 (1992) ("Fourth and finally," under original Cohen doctrine the order must raise 
an important, unsettled issue). Some scholars have argied that the Supreme Court has abandoned 
this issue. See, e.g., id. Even if the issue need not be "unsettled" for the collateral order doctrine 
to apply, in the context of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals, one can assume that the 
defense itself raises an important issue, even though the Court has not explicitly discussed 
"importance" as a distinct fourth factor. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. This 
article assumes the right to be free from unnecessary discovery and trials is one that generally 
raises an important issue within the meaning of the collateral order doctrine. One can also note 
the Court's own numbering- it delineated three. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 
U.S. at 144; see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866 (1994) 
(referring to "three-pronged test for determining when 'collateral order' appeal is allowed"); 
Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989) ("order must satisfy at least three 
conditions" derived from Cohen). But see Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 844 (1996) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "interest being asserted must be an important one"). 
33. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27. 
34. See supra note 9; infra text accompanying notes 184-85. 
35. 515 u.s. 304 (1995). 
36. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,315-18 (1995). 
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held that no jurisdiction existed for appeals from district court orders denying 
summary judgment because of disputes as to material facts.37 However, the 
very next year, in Behrens v. Pelletier,38 the Court drastically narrowed the 
limitation articulated in Johnson.39 Such appeals would now lie if district 
courts also ruled that the law was clearly established.40 
The purpose of this Article is to defme when, under the collateral order 
doctrine, appellate courts have jurisdiction from interlocutory orders in cases 
that raise qualified immunity as a defense. Articulating the scope of appellate 
jurisdiction is important because appellate courts are overprotecting govern-
mental officials and underprotecting constitutionally injured plaintiffs. 
The judicially created qualified immunity defense balances conflicting 
interests. The defense-to-liability prong allows officials to act decisively, 
knowing liability for their actions arises only if they violated clearly established 
law. The immunity-from-suit prong protects society's and the officials' 
interests in not having to spend time defending meritless lawsuits. Opposing 
these interests is society's and a constitutionally injured plaintiff's interest in 
seeking redress for violations of clearly established law. Many appellate courts 
have failed to discern how interlocutory appeals can disrupt this delicate 
balance. In some circumstances, appellate courts have erroneously decided 
factual issues for the jury, imposed heightened pleading burdens, and afforded 
governmental officials the opportunity to create unnecessary delay. 
To safeguard the balance of interests struck by qualified immunity, this 
Article also details an important limit on the erroneous assertion of appellate 
jurisdiction: the doctrine of frivolity, 41 which allows both appellate courts and 
district courts to simultaneously possess jurisdiction. This radical construction 
ofjurisdiction is necessary to avoid meritless delays and allow civil rights cases 
to proceed to trial. 
Part II of this Article reveals that qualified immunity as a defense exists 
solely by judicial creation and interpretation.42 Part II examines the creation 
of the Harlow standard for qualified immunity and describes the defense-to-
liability prong- whether the law was clearly established, the central issue of 
37. Johnson, 5I5 U.S. at3I9-20. Foradiscussionofthiscase,seeinfratextaccompanying 
notes 90-I07, 22I, 240-41. 
38. II6 S. Ct. 834 (I996). 
39. Behrens v. Pelletier, II6 S. Ct. 834, 842 (I996). 
40. !d. For a discussion of Behrens, see infra text accompanying notes I 04-4I, I92-99, 
240-41. 
41. For a discussion of the doctrine of frivolity, see infra text accompanying notes 254-58. 
42. See Achtenberg, supra note I, at 499 (stating that Supreme Court has used at least five 
different approaches for determining when qualified immunity is available and not one is con-
sistent with Congress's intent); infra Part II (indicatingjudicial creation of qualified immunity 
defense). 
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interlocutory appeals.43 
Parts III and IV focus on the Supreme Court's decisions on the collateral 
order doctrine as applied to the qualified immunity defense.44 Part III discusses 
the Court's expansive view of appellate jurisdiction. 45 Part IV focuses on the 
Supreme Court's misguided view of pretrial motions in these interlocutory 
appeals, particularly motions for dismissal and for summary judgment.46 
Part V provides a different perspective of interlocutory appeals by finding 
limits arising from the collateral order doctrine, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and institutional expertise. It applies this different perspective to six 
different orders denying qualified immunity: (1) orders for dismissal; (2) orders 
for summary judgment before discovery; (3) orders denying protection from 
discovery; ( 4) orders for sum!Uary judgment after discovery; ( 5) orders denying 
qualified immunity because the defendant was a private person, not an official 
able to assert immunity; and ( 6) orders denying qualified immunity that are 
later declared by the district court to be frivolous.47 This section argues, contrary 
to both Mitchell and Behrens, that there is no appellate jurisdiction from an 
order refusing to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Instead, jurisdiction 
lies from motions for summary judgment, both before and after discovery, in 
some circumstances. It emphasizes that traditional summary judgment rules 
apply to these interlocutory appeals. Appellate courts should not invade the 
province of the district courts and juries by creating their own factual assump-
tions when district courts deny summary judgment because material facts are 
disputed. It also indicates a jurisdictional line for appeals from orders denying 
protection from discovery: jurisdiction lies if the district court postponed 
deciding whether the law was clearly established until discovery concluded, 
but jurisdiction does not exist if the district court merely determined that discov-
ery was not overly broad. In addition to appellate jurisdiction for these orders, 
jurisdiction also lies when a district court determines in a motion for summary 
judgment before discovery that the defendant is a private person. This type 
of order is reviewable on an interlocutory appeal because it bars defendants 
from later raising qualified immunity, except on appeal from a final judgment. 
Part V also discusses an important check on these orders -the doctrine 
of dual jurisdiction for appeals from frivolous orders.48 In some circumstances, 
both the district court and appellate court have jurisdiction: The district court 
issues an order declaring the appeal to be frivolous and continues its proceed-
43. See infra Part II (discussing standard for qualified immunity defense and defense-to-
liability prong). 
44. See infra Par.s III-IV (discussing collateral order doctrine decisions). 
45. See infra Part III (discussing Court's view of appellate jurisdiction). 
46. See infra Part IV (discussing Court's view of pretrial motions in interlocutmy appeals). 
47. See infra Part V (discussing orders denying qualified immunity). 
48. See infra Part V (discussing doctrine of dual jurisdiction). 
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ings, and the appellate court simultaneously addresses the qualified immunity 
question. This strange jurisdictional creature properly bars officials from 
taking frivolous appeals. Frivolous appeals simply do not protect the interests 
safeguarded in Harlow's immunity-from-suit prong. 
The Article concludes by reflecting on how appellate courts properly 
protect the balance struck by the defense of qualified immunity by recognizing 
their limited, but important, role on interlocutory appeals.49 
IL The Immunity-from-Suit Prong Implied in the Harlow 
Standard of Qualified Immunity 
The qualified immunity defense exists solely by judicial interpretation 
of Congress's intent. 5° It applies to both state and federal officials,S1 even 
though the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that "[e]very person ... shall be 
liable" for constitutional violations52 and even though Congress has not passed 
a statute applying this defense to federal officials. The qualified immunity 
defense for these officials is the result of the Court's ascertaining Congress's 
intent in passing§ 1983 in 1871 and its silence in permitting constitutional tort 
actions against federal officials. 
Ascertaining Congress's intent in this area has been difficult for the 
Supreme Court. 53 At one point, the Court stated that qualified immunity was 
dependent upon the "scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office. "54 
49. See infra Part VI (concluding on proper balance for qualified immunity) 
50. See supra note 1 (listing articles on effect of judicial interpretation on qualified 
immunity). 
51. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982) (stating that it would be 
"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state 
officials under§ 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials" 
(quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978))). 
!d. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). This statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 
53. See supra note 1 (listing articles on effect of judicial interpretation on qualified 
immunity); see also Achtenberg, supra note 1, at 535. Professor Achtenberg states that: 
!d. 
Congress did not intend to resolve immunity issues itself, but rather intended to 
permit the Court to resolve those issues on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, 
Congress did not intend to give the Supreme Court unfettered discretion to create 
immunities based on the Justices' own views of sound public policy. 
54. Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,247 (1974). 
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It also stated that officials lose their qualified immunity by acting in two ways: 
violating undisputed law or acting maliciously.55 
In 1982, however, the Harlow Court revised the qualified immunity stan-
dard without an exegesis as to what Congress must have intended. 56 The Court 
jettisoned the malicious component of the qualified immunity defense. It 
retained, however, the other component- whether the official violated undis-
puted law. This component became the "clearly established" law standard of 
Harlow. In 1987, the Court in Anderson v. Creighton51 discarded linking the 
scope of the immunity with the level of responsibility. 58 Instead, it found that 
qualified immunity applies to all officials performing "discretionary" tasks. 59 
The Harlow Court rejected the malice component on pure policy grounds. 
It declared that such a factual question was eating away at the time officials 
had to perform their duties, harming both society and the decision making 
power of officials. With Harlow, procedures suddenly became very important. 
In 1982, however, the Harlow Court had not yet experienced the effects 
of its own 1986 summary judgment make-over of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 that occurred in a trilogy of cases: Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 60 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 61 and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett. 62 The new view of summary judgment allowed courts to dispose of 
cases in ways that they could not before. A state-of-mind issue was not always 
a bar to summary judgment.63 In some cases, the nonmovant would have to 
provide stronger evidence to oppose summary judgment, 64 and the movant 
could point to the absence of factual support for the nonmovant's claim.65 
Instead of reinterpreting the law of summary judgment as it did in 1986, the 
Harlow Court simply declared that the qualified immunity defense could be 
55. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). In Wood, the Supreme Court held 
that a 
/d. 
school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he 
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of 
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, 
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional rights or other injury to the student. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982}. 
483 u.s. 635 (1987). 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
!d. at 638, 642-43. 
475 u.s. 574 (1986). 
477 u.s. 242 (1986). 
477 u.s. 317 (1986). 
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). 
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,256-57 (1986). 
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23 (1986). 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS AND QUALIFIED IA1M:UNITY 15 
resolved before discovery and on summary judgment. 
The Harlow Court made four procedural observations. First, courts should 
not grant discovery until they have decided whether the law was "clearly estab-
lished" at the time the officials acted. 66 Second, discovery as to whether offi-
cials knewthattheywere violating a citizen's constitutional rights can be broad 
ranging and tremendously disruptive. 67 Third, plaintiffs can easily allege malice 
and force a trial because, under prior summary judgment law, a single sentence 
written in casual correspondence was sufficient to create a triable issue of 
malice.68 Fourth, discovery can create thorny separation-of-powers issues.69 
The Court used these procedural observations to explain why a qualified 
immunity standard built on "objective reasonableness" was better than the prior 
malice test. It implied that application of the qualified immunity defense before 
discovery was an easy task because the clarity of the law determined whether 
the official acted reasonably. If the law was clear, there was no immunity; if 
the law was unclear, there was immunity. The Court labeled this standard as 
"objective" because it measured reasonableness solely through case law, not 
the inside of the official's head. Objective reasonableness thus became linked 
with the issue of notice: If the law was clear, the official should have known 
better; if the law was unclear, the official probably did not know any better. 
Five years later in Anderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court elaborated 
on what constituted sufficient notice and, in a footnote, reinterpreted Harlow 
to allow discovery in some qualified immunity cases.70 In doing so, the Court 
discussed both aspects of the qualified immunity defense, the defense to 
liability and the "immunity from suit."71 
With respectto qualified immunity as a defense to liability, the Anderson 
Court indicated that the language of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits 
"unreasonable searches and seizures," does not automatically put officials on 
notice for purposes of the qualified immunity defense.72 An official can act 
unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment, but act reasonably under the 
Harlow standard. The key to distinguishing between these dual standards of 
reasonableness, according to the Anderson Court, was to interpret the Harlow 
qualified immunity standard as requiring more notice than the Fourth Amend 
ment itself. 73 Under Anderson, qualified-immunity reasonableness focuses on 
66. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
67. Id. at 817-18. 
68. Id. at 817 n.29. 
69. Id. at817n.28. 
70. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 646 n.6 (1987). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 643. 
73. Id. 
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whether the "contours"74 of a constitutional right were sufficiently clear to put 
officials on notice that their actions were unlawful. 
Although no one really knows what constitutes a "contour" of a constitu-
tional right, the Harlow standard, as explained by Anderson, indicates that case 
law is what puts officials on notice. For example, under the Fourth Amend-
ment, the clarity of the law is not measured by current police practices in the 
United States, but rather by reported decisional law. Case law interpreting 
constitutional rights provides officials with notice. 
Although this explanation of the Harlow standard made it easier for 
officials to successfully assert qualified immunity as a defense to liability, the 
Court appropriately recognized that with respect to the procedural aspect of 
the defense -the "immunity from suit" -there were some limitations. In a 
footnote, where the Court frequently buries significant statements, the Anderson 
Court stated that the district court would have to decide whether discovery 
should be granted before it decides the summary judgment motion for qualified 
immunity. 75 This statement sharply contrasted with Harlow's simple statement 
that the defense of qualified immunity question could be resolved without 
discovery on a motion for summary judgment.76 
After Anderson, the Harlow defense-of-liability prong became more 
protective of governmental officials and the "immunity of suit" prong had an 
important gloss. The first prong required courts to more narrowly interpret 
what constitutes "clearly established" law. The second prong, after Anderson, 
permitted discovery in some circumstances. The difficulty is determining what 
circumstances create a need for discovery. 
Anderson's statement on discovery can also raise an important jurisdic-
tional question for interlocutory appeals. Do appellate courts have jurisdiction 
to hear qualified immunity motions when discovery is necessary in the case 
under consideration?77 An examination of Mitchell and its progeny reveals how 
the Court views jurisdiction over appeals· from orders rendered before and after 
discovery. 
Ill The Collateral Order Doctrine: Enlarging Appellate Jurisdiction 
Examining the Supreme Court's decisions discussing jurisdiction for 
interlocutory appeals from orders denying qualified immunity is like looking 
at a partly completed jigsaw puzzle on a table. Both have a few pieces that are 
not yet connected to each other. Withjustfour decisions, Johnson v. F ankell, 78 
74. !d. at 640. 
75. !d. at 646 n.6. 
76. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
77. For a resolution of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 208-09, 220-35. 
78. 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997). 
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Mitchell v. Forsyth, Johnson v. Jones, and Behrens v. Pelletier,79 a coherent 
framework for jurisdictional and procedural analysis is lacking.80 
In its clearest statement of jurisdiction, the Fankell Court indicated that 
the right to an interlocutory appeal from an order denying qualified immunity 
is a procedural right arising from the final judgment statute. 81 It is not a 
substantive right created by Harlow. Jurisdiction for such appeals, thus, comes 
from complying with the Court's collateral order doctrine, 82 a judicially created 
exception to the final-judgment statute. 
Mitchell v. Forsyth and its progeny indicate that some, not all, orders 
denying qualified immunity meet the three elements of the collateral order 
doctrine: (1) the issue can be conclusively resolved on appeal, (2) it is an 
important iss.ue separate from the merits of the case, and (3) it is unreviewable 
from a final judgment.83 In Mitchell, Johnson, and Behrens, officials filed 
interlocutory appeals from orders denying qualified immunity in a motion for 
summary judgment after discovery. In Mitchell and Behrens, jurisdiction was 
present. 84 In Johnson, there was no jurisdiction because the order failed to meet 
the second element, separability. 85 Discerning jurisdiction is not as simple as 
looking at the type of procedural motion before a court. What matters is the 
issue that the court is asked to consider. 
In Mitchell, a plurality of the Court found jurisdiction because the issue 
on appeal was whether the law was clearly established. In examining the first 
element, complete resolution, the plurality stated that this issue was one that 
could be finally resolved in a "motion for dismissal or summary judgment. "86 
Second, the Mitchell plurality determined that the "claim of immunity is 
conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiffs claim."87 It viewed the 
procedural posture of interlocutory appeals as shielding appellate courts from 
having to resolve the merits. The Mitchell plurality stated that appellate courts 
would not need to evaluate the "correctness of the plaintiffs version of the 
facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiffs allegations actually state a 
79. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996). 
80. See generally Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997) (discussing qualified 
immunity); Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct..834, 838-47 (1996) (same); Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304, 309-15 (1995) (same); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985) (plurality 
opinion) (same). 
81. Fanke/1, 117 S. Ct. at 1806. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32. 
84. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. 
85. Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 842; Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316-17. 
86. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
87. /d. at 527-28. 
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claim. "88 They would simply address a separate, resolvable issue -whether 
the law was clearly established when the official acted. Finally, it added that 
the right to be free from unnecessary discovery and trials would be unreview-
able if officials had to wait to appeal from a final judgment. 89 
Ten years later, the Johnson Court found jurisdiction lacking because the 
issue on interlocutory appeal was whether the plaintiff had offered sufficient 
evidence for a jury to determine that officials had violated his constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable force.90 (Later, the Behrens Court would 
interpret the Johnson record as not raising the question whether the law was 
clearly established.91 Presumably, if the jury had believed the injured citizen's 
version of what happened, then the officials would have violated clearly 
established law and would not be entitled to qualified immunity. If it had 
believed the officials, however, then there was no constitutional violation.)92 
The Johnson Court determined that the issue raised on appeal was not 
separate from the merits of the underlying case.93 It recognized that there was 
a difference between entitlement to an interlocutory appeal and an entitle-
ment to summary judgment.94 It explained that Mitchell, when "read in 
context,''95 provided that an official was entitled to summary judgment when 
"discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue."96 
The right to an interlocutory appeal, in contrast, was dependent upon pre-
senting the appellate court with a legal issue that did not require it to 
"consider the correctness of the plaintiffs version of facts. "97 Thus, determin-
ing the sufficiency of evidence on appeal is an impermissible review for 
"correctness." 
The Johnson Court also made three important observations about the 
collateral order doctrine. First, it stated that appealability of orders is deter-
mined by category, not by balancing the interests of the parties in a specific 
case.98 The place for making policy judgments about appealability was in 
88. Id at 528. 
89. !d. at 527. 
90. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). 
91. Beh_rens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). 
92. Although the Supreme Court did not discuss this interpretation of the record, it was 
the officials' position before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Jones v. Johnson, 
26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[d]efendants do not deny that ifthey beat the 
plaintiff, as he believes they did, then they lack immunity"), a.ff'd in part, 515 U.S. 304 (1995). 
93. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314. 
94. /d. at 313-14. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 
97. /d. at 312 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528). 
98. /d. at 315. 
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delineating specific categories, not in case-by-case adjudication. Categorical 
distinctions prevent appellate courts from having to assess the need for review 
whenever an official seeks an interlocutory appeal. In short, the issue raised 
on appeal would have to be categorically important within the meaning of the 
collateral order doctrine to warrant an appeal. Second, the Johnson Court 
recognized that in relying appropriately on the expertise of district courts, 
appellate courts could further the "wise use of appellate resources. "99 It 
suggested that appellate courts would probably not invoke the doctrine of 
pendent appellate jurisdiction to review sufficiency of evidence claims. 100 
Third, the Court suggested that appellate courts may have jurisdiction to 
decide whether the law was clearly established, even when district courts do 
not indicate the facts they assumed in denying summary judgment motions 
asserting qualified immunity.101 In such situations, the appellate courts "may 
have to" 102 review the record to ascertain the facts that the district court 
assumed in denying the summary judgment motion based on qualified immu-
nity. In doing so, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence. The purpose 
of this "cumbersome"103 review is to use the ascertained "assumed facts" and 
99. /d.at317. 
100. /d. at318. Under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, an appellate court has 
discretion to review an issue over which it does not have jurisdiction if the issue is intertwined 
with one issue over which it does have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers County 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995) (stating that no pendent appellate jurisdiction would lie from 
order denying summary judgment for county because it did not raise issue "inextricably 
intertwined with" the officials' qualified immunity motion). See generally RiyazA. Kanji, The 
Proper Scope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100 Y ALEL.J. 
511, 511 (1990) (contending that "the collateral order doctrine supports only a narrow extension 
of appellate jurisdiction to pendent issues"). But see generally Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 
1651 n.41 (1997) (stating that pendent appellate jurisdiction allowed appellate court to evaluate 
district court's staying the sexual harassment trial of President Clinton because this issue was 
sufficiently intertwined with district court's refusal to stay discovery, ironically extending 
jurisdiction to issue of which official did not seek review). 
As applied to qualified immunity appeals, the Johnson Court implied that even if the 
appellate court has jurisdiction over whether the law was clearly established, it would not 
necessarily review sufficiency of evidence claims by invoking pendent appellate jurisdiction. 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,318 (1995). Some courts, however, have nevertheless invoked 
pendent appellate jurisdiction to address the sufficiency of evidence issue. See, e.g., McMillian 
v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1563 (11th Cir.), amended by 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2514 (1997). 
101. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,318-19 (1995). 
102. /d. at 319. Whether the Supreme Court requires appellate courts to review records to 
ascertain the district court's "assumed" facts is a question of semantics. In Behrens v. Pelletier, 
the Court quoted Johnson's language that courts "may have to" do so. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 
S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996) "May have to" falls short of the word "must." For a discussion of 
institutional limits in bar this kind of review, see infra text accompanying notes 236-41. 
103. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. 
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ask the separable question, was the law clearly established. Determining the 
clarity of the law is one question that an appellate court has jurisdiction over 
in light of Mitchell. 
With the separability element as an important jurisdictional limit in 
Johnson, the Behrens Court, the very next year, found two ways to significantly 
expand appellate jurisdiction. 104 First, it narrowly interpreted Johnson as 
stating that appeals sometimes could lie from summary judgment orders 
denying qualified immunity when material facts are in dispute. 105 Second, it 
determined that sometimes officials may take more than one interlocutory 
appeal. 106 It also erroneously suggested that interlocutory appeals would lie 
from motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity. 107 
In Behrens, after discovery had concluded, the district court determined 
that material facts were in dispute and denied the official's motion for summary 
judgment. 108 The official took an interlocutory appeal, and the district court 
issued an order stating that the appeal was frivolous. 109 The court of appeals 
denied jurisdiction, stating that because the official had previously had an 
interlocutory appeal from his motion to dismiss no appeal would lie. no With 
this as the procedural posture of the case, the Behrens Court revisited the 
Johnson Court's view of separability. III Specifically, Behrens considered 
whether the district court's determination of material disputed facts bars 
appellate jurisdiction. 112 It also had to address explicitly whether more than 
one interlocutory appeal would lie under the collateral order doctrine. 
In analyzingjurisdiction when material facts are disputed, the Court made 
an unusually broad statement about summary judgment on interlocutory 
appeals: "Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that 
there are controverted issues of material fact, ... and [Johnson] surely does 
not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable." IIJ 
Although the Court's broad statement ignores other reasons courts may deny 
summary judgment, such as untimely motions, it expressly narrowed the 
Johnson Court's limitation on interlocutory appeals. It did so by stating that 
just because a district court order indicates that material facts are in dispute 
does not mean than an interlocutory appeal is per se barred. 
104. See Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 840-42. 
105. !d. at 842. 
106. !d. at 840-41. 
107. !d. at 840. 
108. !d. at 838. 
109. !d. 
110. !d. 
111. !d. at 842. 
112. !d. 
113. !d. 
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The Behrens Court asserted that appellate courts can, nevertheless, have 
jurisdiction if the district court's order decided not only that material facts are 
in dispute, but also that the law was clearly established. 114 Such orders raise 
two issues. After Johnson, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to decide the 
first issue, the sufficiency of the evidence. However, in light of Mitchell, the 
court has jurisdiction to hear the second issue, the clarity of the law. 
The Behrens Court implied that appeals from orders with disputed facts 
invoke a review process similar to that for orders with undisputed facts. First, 
the appellate court reads the district court's order, which either indicates the 
undisputed facts or the facts it assumed to be in dispute: m Second, the appel-
late court looks at case law and asks whether the law was clearly established 
with respect to the official conduct, as specified in the undisputed facts or in 
the "assumed" facts. 116 If the law was clear, then the official has no immunity, 
whether the official's actions were based on undisputed facts or upon the 
district court's "assumed facts." In the event that the district court did not 
specify the facts it assumed, an appellate court, under both Behrens and 
Johnson, reviews the record to determine what material facts the district court 
assumed to be in dispute.117 
In addition to narrowing the Johnson decision, the Behrens Court ex-
panded jurisdiction by allowing multiple appeals. In doing so, it did not limit 
its holding to the unusual facts ofthe case, nor did it provide a detailed analysis 
of the three elements of the collateral order doctrine- final resolution, separa-
bility, and unreviewability. Although these three elements were implicit in the 
Court's discussion, what was pronounced was the "importance"118 aspect of 
the collateral order doctrine, which some commentators have labeled as a fourth 
element of the doctrine. 119 In addition to discussing the importance of the 
qualified immunity defense, the Court broadly spoke of "finality" and relied 
on dicta from Mitchell to suggest that interlocutory appeals lie from both 
motions for dismissal and for summary judgment.120 
114. /d. 
115. /d. at 842. 
116. !d. 
117. /d. at 842 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,319 (1995)). Like district courts, 
appellate courts are not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to 
determine whether"there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 4 77 U.S. 
242, 249 (1986). If material facts are in dispute, then courts are to resolve the disputes in favor 
of the nonmoving party. !d. at 255. When district courts grant summary judgment motions, 
"[t]here is no requirement that the trial judge make findings of fact." /d. at 250. The Supreme 
Court has nevertheless stated, "In many cases, however, findings are extremely helpful to a 
reviewing court." /d. at 250 n.6. 
118. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996). 
119. See supra note 32 (discussing possible "fourth element" to collateral order doctrine). 
120. Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 839 (stating that "[u]nlessthe plaintiff's allegations state a claim 
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Before the Behrens Court was the second interlocutory appeal from an 
order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity. With respect 
to the question of finality, the Court held that a second interlocutory appeal 
from a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not less 
"final" because of a prior interlocutory appeal seeking dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds. 121 Such a conclusion seems obvious. After discovery, the 
record is fully established and an appellate court can be well situated to address 
the question of whether the law was clearly established. 
The Court, however, in dicta provided expansive statements supporting 
the belief that interlocutory appeals would also lie from motions to dismiss. 122 
Neither the majority nor the dissent thought that appeals from motions to 
dismiss should be per se barred under the collateral order doctrine. 123 The 
dissent only argued that an official should have only one appeal. 124 It did not 
argue that such an appeal should only come from an order denying summary 
judgment.125 
The Court appeared to merge the final resolution element with the 
unreviewability element. It emphasized that motions to dismiss and motions 
for summary judgment raise different issues.126 A motion to dismiss, according 
to the Court, raises the question whether the "conduct as alleged in the 
camp/clint" violated clearly established law.127 A summary judgment motion 
questions whether the evidence indicates a violation of clearly established 
law.128 Because ofthese differences, the Court suggested that officials may 
need interlocutory appeals from both motions.129 The question ofwl1ether such 
appeals raise unreviewable issues is, however, different from the question of 
of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to 
dismissal before the commencement of discovery") (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
526 (1985)). 
121. /d. at 839. 
122. /d. at 840. The Court explained how to review interlocutory appeals from motions 
to dismiss: "[I]t is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for 
'objective legal reasonableness."' /d. The Court also broadly stated: 
/d. 
It is no more true that the defendant who has unsuccessfully appealed denial of a 
motion to dismiss has no need to appeal denial of a motion for summary judgment, 
than it is that the defendant who has unsuccessfully made a motion to dismiss has 
no need to make a motion for summary judgment. 
123. /d.; see also id. at 843 (Breyer, J ., dissenting). 
124. /d. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
125. /d. 
126. /d. at 840. 
127. /d. 
128. /d. at 842. 
129. /d. at 840. 
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whether a particular motion conclusively determines an issue, as required by 
the collateral order doctrine. 130 
With respect to the second element, separability, the Court stated in a 
footnote that appellate courts should not resolve this issue by comparing the 
two interlocutory appeals to each other.131 Instead, according to the Court, 
separability focuses on whether the asserted issue for review, qualified 
immunity, is separate from the merits, not from a potential future appeal or 
from a prior appeal.132 Such a point is sound, but comparison of the appeals 
should be relevant for determining the issue offmal resolution, not separability. 
The third element, unreviewability, was implicit in the Court's discussion 
of the different procedural questions for motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment.133 The Court found that the qualified immunity issue raised 
in a motion to dismiss would not be reviewed in a motion for summary 
judgment. 
The "fourth element," the importance of the issue for interlocutory review, 
seemed to be the centerpiece for both the majority134 and dissent.135 For the 
majority, the "immunity of suit" prong of Harlow created an interest that 
merited the protection of multiple appeals.136 For the dissent, the Harlow quali-
fied immunity standard did not create an "anti-discovery right"137 to be pro-
tected on interlocutory appeal. 
In addition to these elements, the Court considered dicta in Mitchell to 
justify multiple appeals. 138 In Mitchell, a plurality of the Court stated that 
officials asserting qualified immunity are "entitled to dismissal before the 
commencement of discovery"139 or may be "entitled to summary judgment if 
discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to 
whether the defendant in fact committed those acts."140 The Behrens Court 
used this language from Mitchell to justify multiple appeals. In sharp contrast, 
the Johnson Court referred to this summary judgment language in Mitchell as 
discussing only the entitlement to summary judgment, not to the entitlement 
to an interlocutory appeal.141 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32. 
131. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct 834, 840 n.3 (1996). 
132. /d. 
133. /d. at 840. 
134. /d. at 839-40. 
135. /d. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
136. /d. at 840. 
137. /d. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
138. /d. at 839. 
139. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
140. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct 834, 839 (1996)(quotingMitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). 
141. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,313-314 (1995). 
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The Court has thus suggested in Mitchell and its progeny that interlocutory 
appeals would sometimes lie both from motions for dismissal as well as for 
summary judgment. In Johnson, the Court made an important distinction. An 
entitlement to summary judgment can be different from the right to an inter-
locutory appeal. 142 The interlocutory appeal requires the appellate court to have 
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. In contrast, the summary 
judgment motion only e~amines the two elements for summary judgment, the 
absence of material disputed facts and entitlement to judgment as a matter of 
law. An examination of the Court's comments on procedures shows how it 
has interpreted the immunity-of-suit prong to justify early dismissal or summary 
judgment. 
IV. The Supreme Court's View of the Appellate Record: 
Motions for Dismissal and Summary Judgment Raising Qualified Immunity 
During interlocutory appeals from orders denying qualified immunity, the 
Supreme Court has broadly interpreted and sometimes implicitly rewritten the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perhaps these interpretative problems have 
occurred because the Court has only generally referred to motions for dismissal 
and motions for summary judgment, notto specific rules. The applicable Rules 
are Rule 12(b )(6), 143 which provides for dismissal when plaintiffs fail to state 
a claim; Rule 12( c), 144 which provides for judgment on the pleadings; and Rule 
56(c)/45 which provides for summary judgment. The Court has generally 
discussed procedure with respect to both prongs of the qualified immunity 
defense - the defense-of-liability prong and the immunity-of-suit prong. 
Placing the Court's procedural comments in the framework of the typical course 
of litigation involves motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment before 
discovery, and motions for- summary judgment after discovery. 
A. Motions to Dismiss 
The traditional rules of procedure require plaintiffs to provide 11a short 
and plain statement of the clairn11 in their complaints, 146 and officials are to raise 
142. /d. at317-18. 
143. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal when plaintiffs fail "to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted"). 
144. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(c) (stating that judgment on pleadings does not allow court to 
consider materials outside pleadings). 
145. FED. R. Crv. P. 56( c) (stating that summary judgment is allowed if "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of Jaw"). 
146. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a)(2). 
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the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in their answers.147 The Court's 
suggestion of a "heightened pleading" standard for plaintiffs conflicts with 
these traditional rules. 148 Under the Court's suggested "heightened pleading" 
standard, plaintiffs are to anticipate that officials will raise this defense in their 
answer and, thus, should specifically allege facts that reveal that the law was 
clearly established when the officials violated their constitutional rights. 149 
In addition to this reworking of the Federal Rules, the Court also suggested 
in Siegert v. Gilleyi50 that courts should first decide whether plaintiffs have 
stated constitutional violations before determining whether the law was clearly 
established.151 The need to initially decide whether plaintiffs have stated 
constitutional violations _is not clear152 because, since Siegert, the Court has 
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding that 
qualified immunity is affirmative defense that plaintiffs do not need to anticipate in their com-
plaints). 
148. The Supreme Court in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit rejected applying a heightened pleading standard to lawsuits against local 
governmental entities. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence& Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The Court did, however, specifically leave open whether there is a 
heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs asserting violations of their constitutional rights by 
officials sued in their individual capacity. /d. at 166. In three opinions, the Court suggested that 
such a standard is applicable. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, a plurality of the Court stated that, " [ u ]nless 
the plaintiff's allegations state a claim ofviolation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading 
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Mitchell 
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1993). In two decisions since Leatherman, the Court in dicta 
discussed motions to dismiss. In Behrens v. Pelletier, the Court declared that in a motion for 
dismissal "it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for 
'objective legal reasonableness."' Behrensv. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996). In Johnson 
v. Fankell, the Court stated that, "when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly estab-
lished law ... [the qualified immunity defense] provides the defendant with an immunity from 
the burdens of trial as well as a defense to liability." Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1803 
(1997). Whenhintingthataheightened pleading standard would apply, the Court thus judicially 
"amended" the Federal Rules of Procedure to further Harlow's goal of ridding meritless suits. 
149. For a detailed discussion of the heightened pleading issue, see Karen M. Blum, 
Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman, 44 CATii. U. L. REv. 59, 71-95 (1994). 
Professor Blum contends that "[n]o special pleading burden should be placed on plaintiffs in 
section 1983 individual capacity suits." /d. at 92. See generally Eric Kugler, A 1983 Hurdle: 
Filtering Meritless Civil Rights Litigation at the Pleading Stage, 15 REv. LITIG. 551,562-65, 
576 (1996) (advocating Congress amend Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require plaintiffs 
to provide reply to official's answer that asserts qualified immunity). 
150. 500 u.s. 226 (1991). 
151. Siegertv. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,232 (1991) (stating court of appeals should have first 
decided whether plaintiff had stated claim). 
152. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Siegert appropriately rejected requiring courts to 
first decide whether the plaintiff has stated a claim when officials assert qualified immunity. 
/d. at235 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "it seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues 
to tell the trial and appellate courts that they should resolve the constitutional question first"). 
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failed to follow its own ruling.153 For example, in both Hunter v. Bryant154 and 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, ISS the Court addressed the immunity issue without 
determining whether the officials had violated the Constitution. 156 
Under the Court's procedural perspective, appellate courts are to exam-
ine plaintiffs' complaints and ask whether the allegations state a violation of 
clearly established law. In doing so, courts are to assume that the facts as 
alleged by the plaintiff are true. 157 If allegations do not state a violation of 
clearly established law, then officials are entitled to dismissal. Dismissal is 
also possible under Siegert if the complaint does not allege a constitutional 
violation.158 
B. Motions for Summary Judgment Before Dis9overy 
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court reformulated the qualified immunity 
standard to eliminate meritless cases in motions for summary judgment before 
discovery.159 Yet, as the Court has noted both in Johnson v. Fankell and 
Anderson v. Creighton, some cases cannot be dismissed before discovery .160 
See generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring) (advocating principle of resolving case on non constitutional grounds if possible). 
In response to Siegert's ordering of the issues, several courts have wisely not followed the Court's 
ruling. See, e.g., DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 799 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating court should 
be able to resolve case "on the most expedient ground"). One scholar has correctly noted that 
the proper procedure for determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim is a motion for 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6). Chen, supra note 1, 280 n.1 07 (1995) 
(stating that "[i]tis clear to me that the Court's characterization of its immunity analysis in Siegert 
is misguided, for that ordering of decision making suggests that the Court is not engaged in 
qualified immunity analysis at all"). 
153. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Hunterv. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224 (1991). 
154. 502 u.s. 224 (1991). 
155. 509 u.s. 259 (1993). 
156. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509U.S. 259,267 n.3 (1993); Hunterv. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224, 228 (1991). 
157. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996). 
158. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1991). In Siegert, the Court considered an 
appeal from a district court's order, which denied the official's motion to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, for summary judgment. Id. at 229. The official took an interlocutory appeal when 
the district court ruled that discovery could proceed. !d. at 230. The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia determined that the plaintiff failed to state a constitutional violation. Id. 
The Court then determined that the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to overcome the 
qualified immunity defense. !d. at 230-31. 
159. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
160. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1803, 1803 n.2 (1997) (stating that "when a case can 
be dismissed on the pleadings or in an early pre-trial stage, qualified immunity also provides 
officials with the valuable protection from 'the burdens of broad-ranging discovery'" (quoting 
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In Anderson, the Court suggested how courts should decide whether to grant 
discovery.161 It also noted, that if courts were to grant discovery, they should 
tailor it to the immunity question. 162 
The Anderson Court offered a two-part inquiry for determining when to 
grant discovery under the circumstances of that case.163 The first question 
focuses on the plaintiffs' allegations; the second focuses on the official's 
"admitted" conduct.164 The court is to examine whether each states a violation 
of clearly established law.165 
If the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of clearly established law, then 
the official is entitled to "dismissal prior to discovery."166 This view is consis-
tent with how the Supreme Court has suggested that courts view motions for 
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Courts assume that the allegations 
are truthful and determine whether the challenged actions are ones ·"that a 
reasonable officer could have believed lawful."167 If they are, then the official 
would be entitled to qualified immunity because the official would not have 
violated clearly established law. 
If the plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient, then the court examines the 
official's asserted conduct and questions whether the official's version of what 
happened indicates a violation of clearly established law. If it does, then in 
light of the qualified immunity standard as interpreted by the Court, the official 
would not have qualified immunity. 
The Anderson Court proceeded to address the more common situation-
when the plaintiff's allegations state a violation of clearly established law and 
the official's version does not indicate a violation of clearly established law. 168 
In that situation, a court should grant discovery.169 As the Anderson Court 
noted, this discovery is not broad-ranging. Instead, it is to be narrowly focused 
on the resolution of factual issues to aid in deciding the immunity question in 
a motion for summary judgment after discovery.170 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987). 
161. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. 
162. /d. 
163. At issue in Anderson was a warrantless search for a fugitive. An FBI agent had 
allegedly entered the plaintiffs' home searching for a person who did not reside there. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 637. 
164. !d. at 646 n.6. 
165. /d. 
166. /d. 
167. /d. 
168. /d. 
169. /d. 
170. /d. 
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C. Motions for Summary Judgment After Discovery 
When a district court denies summary judgment, asserting qualified 
immunity after discovery has occurred, its order may specify different 
underlying bases for its decisions: (1) it may only state that material facts are 
in dispute; (2) it may state that the facts are not in dispute and that the law was 
clearly established; or (3) it may state that material facts are disputed and that 
the law was clearly established. The Supreme Court considered the first 
scenario in Johnson and did not find appellate jurisdiction.171 With respect to 
the second and third situations, the Court in Behrens v. Pelletier172 impliedly 
found them indistinguishable. 173 Behrens and Johnson also provided that even 
if the district court's order does not specify which facts are in dispute, an 
appellate court may review the entire record on appeal. This review would be 
to hypothetically reconstruct the district court's assumed facts. 174 Thus, even 
if district courts do not specify the assumed facts for summary judgment, an 
appellate court is to view the record "in a light more favorable to the plaintiff 
and ask the central question for interlocutory appeals: Was the law clearly 
established in light of the facts hypothesized by the appellate court? 
Whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal 
from a motion to dismiss or from a motion for summary judgment is a compleY 
matter, one that also invites consideration of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. An examination of the Court's interpretation of the collateral order 
doctrine reveals that the Court is expanding appellate jurisdiction and ignoring 
some ofthe Rules of Civil Procedure. 
V. The Proper Scope of Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Denying 
Qualified Immunity 
The Supreme Court and appellate courts have ignored important limits 
on their jurisdiction.175 Limits come from the Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Seventh Amendment/76 a more narrow interpretation of the collateral order 
doctrine, and appropriate deference to district courts and Congress. If courts 
adhered to these limits, they would have jurisdiction for appeals from some 
171. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). 
172. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 1 08-17 (discussing Supreme Court's perspective 
on motions for summary judgment after discovery in which district court denies qualified 
immunity as defense). 
174. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 103,115-17. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12; supra notes 6-9. 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that "the rightoftrial by jury shall be preserved"). 
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orders denying summary judgment, before177 and after discovery, 178 and no 
jurisdiction for appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss179 on qualified 
immunity grounds, nor from orders denyingjudgment on the pleadings.180 
A. Orders for Dismissal 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Behrens erroneously suggested 
that interlocutory appeals would lie from denials of motions to dismiss raising 
qualified immunity as a defense. In this decision, without analysis of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court assumed that such motions properly 
raised the central qualified immunity question- whether the law was clearly 
established when the official acted. Instead of discussing the Rules, the Court 
briefly examined the three elements of the collateral order doctrine: finality, 
separability, and unreviewability. It found that interlocutory appeals from 
motions to dismiss met all three requirements. In contrast, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and a narrower construction of the collateral order doctrine 
support finding no interlocutory jurisdiction for appeals from orders denying 
qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss. 
When officials file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, they 
are generally seeking to dismiss the action because the plaintiff failed to allege 
a violation of clearly established law. Two provisions are common: Rule 
12(b)(6),181 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Rule 12(c),182 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
1. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
Under the traditional view of Rule 12(b)(6), a district court would have 
to consider only whether the plaintiff stated a claim. Because qualified 
immunity is an affirmative defense, officials must plead it in their answers.183 
With the injection of the qualified immunity defense in the answer, a motion 
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity is improper 
because it goes outside the traditional scope of the rule-whether the plaintiff 
has alleged a claim. 
Interlocutmy appeals will not lie from such motions despite the Supreme 
Court's statement in Siegertv. Gilley that in considering the qualified immunity 
177. See infra text accompanying notes 200-09. 
178. See infra text accompanying notes 236-41. 
179. See infra text accompanying notes 181-86. 
180. See infra text accompanying notes 187-199. 
181. See supra note 143. 
182. See supra note 144. 
183. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). 
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defense, courts should first consider whether the plaintiffhas stated a claim.184 
First, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the qualified immunity 
defense cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
Second, Siegert assumed that the reviewing court had jurisdiction to decide 
whether the law was clearly established. The collateral order doctrine requires 
the issue raised on an interlocutory appeal to be separate from the merits. 
Because a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim raises a question only 
about the merits, it is not reviewable within the terms of the collateral order 
doctrine. 
Furthermore, courts should also note when interpreting the collateral order 
doctrine as to appeals from motions to dismiss that the discussion of motions 
to dismiss in Behrens was dicta. At issue was whether a summary judgment 
motion after discovery was final within the meaning of the collateral order doc-
trine. Even though the record did raise the question of multiple appeals, the 
Court's comments on appeals from motions to dismiss are different from its 
determination that more than one appeal is possible.185 For example, appeals 
may lie from some summary judgment motions both before and after dis-
covery.186 
Thus, under the appellate courts' erroneous heightened pleading standard, 
not only have the courts rewritten pleading rules, but they have also expanded 
jurisdiction without serious consideration as to the separability element neces-
sary for appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. There simply is 
no appellate jurisdiction to review a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
constitutional violation. 
2. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings 
Appellate courts also do not have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals 
from orders denying qualified immunity from motions for judgment on the 
pleadings. The problem for the reviewing court does not lie with procedural 
rules, but rather with the collateral order doctrine. 
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), courts 
typically consider two pleadings-the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's 
184. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). For a discussion of Siegert, see supra 
text accompanying notes 150-52, 158. 
185. For example, in the related area of absolute immunity, the Court heard an interlocutory 
appeal from President Clinton that argued neither for absolute immunity nor qualified immunity; 
the President simply argued that under absolute immunity jurisprudence, a deferral both of 
discovery and trial was appropriate until he completed his second term. Clinton v. Jones, 117 
S. Ct. 1636, 1640 (1997). The Court's rejection of the President's request for deferral surely 
does not bar him from asserting qualified immunity and seeking any interlocutory appeals that 
comply with the procedural rules and the collateral order doctrine. 
186. See infra text accompanying notes 200-09, 236-41. 
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answer.187 Under Rule 7, a district court has discretion to order the plaintiff 
to reply to the defendant's answer. 188 When the district court has so ordered, 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings would consider the complaint, the 
answer, and the reply. 
Although this motion allows officials to raise qualified immunity in their 
answers, the plaintiff need not anticipate the affirmative defense in the 
complaint. The plaintiff may, however, address the immunity question in a 
reply. To further Harlow's goal of getting rid ofmeritless suits as soon as 
possible, one appellate court has infringed upon the district court's discretion 
to order a reply.189 It has suggested that in most cases the reply must be 
forthcoming. 190 
Under the traditional rules of procedure, plaintiffs need not plead with 
specificity in the complaint and district courts have discretion to order replies. 
If in a given case the district court had the discretion to order a reply and did 
so, then the qualified immunity issue would be procedurally raised as provided 
for under the rules. 
The next question would be whether the order denying qualified immunity 
from a motion for judgment on the pleadings meets the three elements of the 
collateral order doctrine. In contrast to the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the collateral order doctrine in Behrens, courts should recognize that such 
appeals meet the final resolution and separability elements, but do not meet 
the unreviewability element of the collateral order doctrine. 
The separability element is always met when the issue before the appellate 
court is whether the law was clearly established when the official took the 
challenged action. The Mitchell plurality first explained that such an issue is 
separable from the merits because it does not ask two questions: whether the 
plaintiff's allegations are "correct" or whether the plaintiffhas stated a claim. 
A review for "correctness" is a review examining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, an issue that explores the merits of the case and is thus not 
separable. 191 Similarly, whether the plaintiff has stated a claim is a merits 
question. Yet, if the appellate court has jurisdiction to decide the clearly 
established issue, it has discretion to decide whether the plaintiff has stated a 
claim, because this latter issue is logically a part of the qualified immunity 
question. If there is no constitutional violation at all, then the law could not 
have been clearly established that the official acted in violation of the Constitu-
tion. But whether there was a constitutional violation and whether there was 
187. See supra note 144. 
188. See supra note 7. 
189. Schul tea v. Wood, 4 7 F .3d 1427, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1995)( en bane). For a discussion 
of Schu/tea, see supra note 7. 
190. Schu/tea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
191. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,313-15 (1995). 
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a violation of a clearly established right are still separate questions, and the 
second question is not a "merits" issue. 
Similarly, when the issue before the appellate court is whether the law was 
clearly established, the finality element is met whether officials assert qualified 
immunity as to a single claim or multiple claims. When reviewing a single 
claim, if the court decides that the law was not clearly established, it finally 
resolves a disputed issue that is separate from the merits. When a court 
considers multiple claims, it may grant qualified immunity as to some claims 
and not to others. The Supreme Court in Behrens properly recognized that 
jurisdiction exists over appeals from orders denying qualified immunity for 
multiple claims.192 To hold otherwise would be to give plaintiffs the power 
to deny interlocutory review and to nullify the immunity-from-suit prong by 
simply appending a claim for which qualified immunity clearly does not apply, 
such as a claim for equitable relief.193 
If, however, the appellate court determines, based on the plaintiffs 
allegations, that the law was clearly established, then officials may raise 
qualified immunity later in the lawsuit- by motions for summary judgment 
before and after discovery194 and by motions for judgment as a matter oflaw. 195 
This ability to raise the qualified immunity defense repeatedly is why courts 
need to consider the third element for jurisdiction under the collateral order 
doctrine- unreviewability. 
The Behrens Court did not have to specify how many appeals were 
possible. Before the court was the question of an interlocutory appeal from 
a denial of motion for summary judgment after discovery. It failed, however, 
to discuss the purpose of the final judgment statute- opposition to piecemeal 
appeals. 196 It simply did not see a piecemeal problem on the horizon. It naively 
stated that decisional law reflects that officials do not take multiple interlocu-
tory appeals. Although case law did indicate the rarity of multiple appeals, the 
192. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 841-42 (1996). 
193. !d. at 842. 
194. See infra text accompanying notes 200-09, 236-41. 
195. FED. R. Crv. P. 50 (providing that courts may grant judgment as matter oflaw during 
trials and after trials). See, e.g., Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(determining interlocutory appeal would lie after district court ordered new trial because official 
still has defense to liability, even if asserted for first time); Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, 
924 F .2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that official may raise qualified immunity during "trial 
and after judgment"); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1206 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Krause 
v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 368 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989) (same). 
196. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability By Court Rule: 
Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITI. L. REv. 717, 726 (1993)(stating that "ChiefJustice 
Marshall ... surmised that Congress intended the final judgment rule to be a mechanism to avoid 
'all the delays and expense incident to a repeated revision' of fragmented appeals of a single 
issue") (quoting United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 354, 355 (1835)). 
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reason they were not common should have been apparent to the Court. Many 
courts of appeal, like the lower court in Behrens, 197 had previously interpreted 
the final judgment statute to bar multiple appeals.198 
The Behrens Court found that appeals from "motions to dismiss" using 
a heightened pleading standard and from motions for summary judgment both 
met the unreviewability element. To justify its conclusion, the Court simply 
restated the questions asked by the motions, using its procedural bending of 
Rule 12. (The motion to dismiss questions whether the plaintiff has stated a 
violation of clearly established law, and the motion for summary judgment 
examines the evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff and asks whether 
the law was clearly established.) Behrens linked the need for review with the 
presence of multiple motions provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
suggested that just because an official loses a motion to dismiss does not mean 
the official has no need to make a motion for summary judgment. 
A more narrow interpretation of the reviewability requirement suggests 
that interlocutory appeals lie from motions for summary judgment before 
discovery, but not from motions for judgment on the pleadings or motions to 
dismiss.199 Although each motion can be brought before discovery and asks 
the same reviewable question (Was the law clearly established?), the motion 
for summary judgment can be brought before discovery. The motion for sum-
mary judgment allows the plaintiff to submit affidavits to elaborate on the 
simple and plain statement in the complaint, as allowed by the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. In examining these three motions, appellate courts should 
determine the unreviewability element to be met only by the motion for 
summary judgment before discovery. Appellate courts would properly afford 
deference to Congress, who enacted the final judgment statute and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Orders for Summary Judgment Before Discovery 
The Supreme Court has stated that the qualified immunity defense can 
be resolved in summary judgment motions both before200 and after discovery. 201 
197. Pelletierv. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
"[o]ne such interlocutory appeal is all that a government official is entitled to and all that we 
will entertain"), rev 'd sub nom. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct 834, 842 (1996). 
198. The Behrens decision thus reversed the one-interlocutory appeal rule in numerous 
circuits. See, e.g., Abel v. Miller, 904 F.2d 394, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that single 
appellate review as to whether there shall be trial is sufficient and that"[ u ]nless courts of appeals 
are careful, appeals on the authority of Mitchell could ossify civil rights litigation"). 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 183-98. 
200. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818-19 (1982). 
201. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). 
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In doing so, it clearly indicated that officials may have two summary judgment 
motions and that the distinction between the two is the presence or absence of 
discovery. Although repetitive summary judgments motions are generally not 
permitted under Rule 56/02 the Supreme Court has suggested two motions in 
the context of qualified immunity. The frrstmotion is the more difficult of the 
two to understand because motions for summary judgment after discovery are 
commonplace. Motions for summary judgment before discovery asserting qual-
ified immunity raise difficult procedural and jurisdictional questions on appeal. 
1. Procedural Interpretations 
Under Rule 56( c), district courts focus on two major issues: whether there 
are material disputed facts and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter oflaw. In discussing summary judgment motions before discovery, 
the Court in Harlow andAnderson considered only how the qualified immunity 
defense could be successfully asserted as a matter of law. If the law was not 
clearly established, then immunity was available on a motion for summary 
judgment before discovery. 
When officials move for summary judgment before discovery, their 
motions may be built on different views of the plaintiff's complaint and ability 
to support the allegations in the complaint. Three situations are probably 
common: (1) the officials believe that even under the plaintiff's version of 
what happened, they did not violate clearly established law; (2) even if the 
plaintiff's version of what happened indicates a violation of clearly established 
law, she does not have evidence to support her version; or (3) the officials do 
not adopt the plaintiff's version of what happened and argue that under their 
version of the facts the law was not clearly established. 
The first situation may be what the Harlow Court envisioned when it 
stated in dicta, " [ u ]ntil the threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery 
should not be allowed." The threshold immunity question is whether the law 
was clearly established. In a summary judgment motion before discovery, a 
202. See, e.g., Enlowv. Tishomingo County, 962F.2d 501,507 (5th Cir. 1992) (pennitting 
interlocutory appeal from second summary judgment motion that occurred after discovery). In 
Enlow, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed that the second summary judgment motion 
must offer an "expanded record." /d. at 506. The second motion must be different otherwise 
an appeal from the second motion would make "a mockery of the requirement that notice to 
appeal must be perfected within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order." /d. 
at506 (citing FED.R.APP. P. 4(a)(1)); see also Annstrongv. Texas StateBd. ofBarber Exam'rs, 
30 F.3d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1994) (detennining that there was no jurisdiction from order that 
denied summary judgment on qualified immunity because it was indistinguishable from district 
court's prior order denying official's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds}. See 
generally 11 JAMESWM.MOOREET AL.,MOORE'SFEDERALPRACTICE~56.10[7] (3ded.1997) 
(stating summary judgment is pennissible if second motion is "sufficiently distinct" from first). 
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plaintiff has not had an opportunity to develop a detailed evidentiary trail to 
prove her version. The lack of discovery is not as problematic if officials 
contend that for the sake of this prediscovery motion the plaintiff's version of 
the facts governs and that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
oflaw because the law was not clearly established. Although under summary 
judgment rules, the moving party (the official in a civil rights action) does not 
have to assume the truth of the nonmovant's factual allegation, the moving 
party may nevertheless do so.203 
If the motion for summary judgment before discovery assumes the 
truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, then it would be similar to the Court's 
overly broad view of motions to dismiss.204 Both would assume the plaintiff's 
allegations are true and ask whether the law was clearly established. Yet, at 
this procedural stage, a plaintiff may submit affidavits to rebut the qualified 
immunity defense.205 
Under the second situation, officials are not assuming the truthfulness of 
the plaintiff's version of what happened. Instead, they are focusing on the 
evidentiary support for the plaintiff's version. Traditional summary judgment 
motions can focus on evidentiary insufficiency, probably because discovery 
has occurred. In contrast, such a focus by officials asserting qualified immunity 
may be problematic when discovery has not occurred.206 Without discovery, 
a plaintiff would need to engage in "informal discovery," in which the plaintiff 
attempts to gather evidence on her own. If the claim before the court indicates 
that important information lies solely in the official's reach, then the district 
court judge may apply Rule 56(£)207 and authorize limited discovery. 
203. Such a procedure is similar to the Behrens Court's handling of disputed material facts 
on interlocutory appeals. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). In Behrens, the Court 
instructed appellate courts to decide whether the official is entitled to summary judgment by using 
the district court's assumed facts, those that the district court found sufficiently supported. !d. 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 146-58. 
205. Thus by considering summary judgment before discovery, courts would not necessarily 
have to impose a heightened pleading standard for writing complaints. 
206. In Siegertv. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991 ), only Justice Kennedy thought that there was 
no problem because he labeled qualified immunity a "substantive defense" derived from Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Yet, in Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct.1800 (1997), he joined 
the Court to label the rightto an interlocutory appeal a procedural right To distinguish substance 
from procedure, one may note that state courts in § 1983 actions must consider the qualified 
immunity defense if properly raised, but they do not have to grant interlocutory appeals from 
orders denying qualified immunity. See, e.g., Rose v. Howlett, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
207. FED. R CIV. P. 56( f). This rule affords district courts discretion in allowing further 
development of the facts. The rule provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
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The third type of motion also raises discovery problems. In this situa-
tion, because the record is so undeveloped, a district court may similarly rule 
that discovery is necessary before resolving the clearly established law ques-
tion. With these contrasting "positional" postures for summary judgment 
motions before discovery, the next question is whether an appellate court would 
have jurisdiction from orders denying qualified immunity arising from these 
motions. 
2. Jurisdictional Interpretation 
With respect to the three motions, jurisdiction will lie when discovery is 
not necessary to resolve the motion for summary judgment. The first motion 
is free from a discovery problem because it assumes, for purposes of this 
summary judgment motion, that the plaintiff's allegations govern. The second 
and third motions can raise discovery problems. 
If courts assume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations in a motion 
for summary judgment before discovery, then the only question raised on inter-
locutory appeal is whether these allegations state a violation of clearly estab-
lished law. This issue meets all three jurisdictional elements-final resolution, 
separability, and unreviewability. 
First, if the appellate court reverses the district court's decision and deter-
mines that the law was not clearly established, then the appellate court would 
be conclusively determining the qualified immunity issue. The official would 
have qualified immunity from the claim under consideration. Second, such 
an issue is separate from the merits of the case. It does not require courts to 
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim or whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim. 
Third, it is also technically unreviewable at a later procedural stage. In 
a motion for summary judgment before discovery, officials are seeking not only 
freedom from paying damages and a trial, but more importantly, freedom from 
discovery. Such a determination before discovery is possible if the court uses 
the plaintiff's version of what happened. 
In contrast, the second type of summary judgment motion before discovery 
invites the appellate court to determine evidentiary insufficiency. This type 
of review would fail to meet the separability requirement of the collateral order 
doctrine, as properly noted in Johnson.208 What is missing in this motion is 
a challenge to whether the law was clearly established. 
I d. 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
208. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-15 (1995). For a discussion of the separability 
problem, see supra text accompanying note 191. 
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The third kind of motion may raise a discovery problem because the 
officials and the plaintiff may dispute the material facts. This is the hypotheti-
cal situation posed in Anderson, where the Court authorized tailored 
discovery. 209 If officials assert that the law was not clearly established and do 
not adopt the plaintiff's version, a district court may issue an order postponing 
its decision until discovery has occurred. Typically officials would then seek 
protection from discovery. If denied, they may attempt to appeal the order 
denying protection. Addressing the jurisdictional issue for the third summary 
judgment motion is thus linked to the appealability of discovery orders. 
C. Orders Granting Discovery 
According to both Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Anderson v. Creighton, the 
qualified immunity defense sometimes makes discovery unnecessary and 
sometimes requires tailored discovery.210 The propriety of discovery depends 
upon the official's acceptance or rejection of the plaintiff's facts. Under 
Harlow, district courts may decide a summary judgment motion based on 
qualified immunity before discovery has occurred.211 Under Anderson, district 
courts are to order tailored discovery if the plaintiff alleges a violation of 
clearly established law and the officials contend that they did not do what the 
plaintiff alleges and that their true actions did not violate clearly established 
law.212 When district courts allow discovery to proceed, officials will often 
file motions for protection from discovery. Some of these orders fulfill the 
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.213 Others do not.214 
A district court's order denying protection from discovery often occurs 
in two situations. First, district courts sometimes order discovery after denying 
an official's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.215 (Complying 
with current procedural rules, officials should raise qualified immunity in 
209. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987). 
210. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. 
211. Harlow, 457 U.S. 818. 
212. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. When district courts before discovery determine 
whether the law was clearly established based on the complaint and the supporting affidavits, 
they typically are faced with two contrasting stories of what happened. In these situations, under 
the plaintiff's version of the facts, the official violated clearly established law; under the official's 
version, no constitutional violation occurred, or if one did, the law was not clearly established. 
At this point, district courts properly deny the official's summary judgment motion raising 
qualified immunity and allow tailored discovery. !d. 
213. See infra text pp. 37-39. 
214. See infra text pp. 39-40. 
215. If officials did not move for summary judgment before discovery, an appellate court 
may interpret their failure as waiving their right to appeal at that procedural stage. Another 
interlocutory appeal would protect their right to be free from trial after discovery has occurred. 
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motions for summary judgment before discovery, not in motions to dismiss. )216 
Second, district courts sometimes postpone deciding officials' motions to 
dismiss based on qualified immunity until discovery has concluded. In the first 
situation, the orders denying protection from discovery raise the general 
prohibition against allowing interlocutory appeals from discovery orders and 
are rarely appealable.217 The second situation implicates the fmality issues of 
motions for summary judgment before discovery and should be appealable218 
unless such an appeal would be frivolous.219 
1. Discovery After Denying Qualified Immunity 
When district courts deny qualified immunity in motions for summary 
judgment before discovery, they have issued an order from which an interlocu-
tory appeal would lie, as long as the appeal is not frivolous. In this appeal, the 
appellate court can vindicate a right protected by the immunity-from-suit 
prong- the right to be free from avoidable discovery. If the appellate court 
disagrees with the district court, then the officials will have immunity and be 
free from discovery. If the appellate court agrees with the district court, 
implicit in the court's ruling is that discovery should go forward. 
Yet, the Anderson Court indicated that when the facts of a case warrant 
discovery, such discovery should be tailored to the qualified immunity question. 
Anderson thus suggests that officials should not be subject to overly broad 
discovery. Thus, even if discovery is permissible, officials sometimes seek 
protection from overly broad discovery. 220 Under the collateral order doctrine, 
appellate courts should determine that they lack jurisdiction to hear these 
appeals. 
This doctrine requires courts to consider whether the asserted right to be 
free from overly broad discovery is an important issue that meets the elements 
of finality, separability, and unreviewability. How one applies these factors 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86, 200-09. 
217. 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,F'EDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE § 3914.23 
(2d ed. 1992) (stating that although discovery orders have provided "a superb testing illustration 
of the final judgment rule at work," "the rule remains settled that most discovery rulings are not 
final"). But see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw. L.J. 1045, 1047 (1990) (arguing that "interlocutory review of 
discovery orders is not the demon that commentators fear"). 
218. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33. 
219. See infra text accompanying notes 257-62. 
220. See, e.g., Gaines v. Davis, 928 F.2d 705,707 (5th Cir. 1991)(statingthat "immediate 
appeal is available for discovery orders which are either avoidable or overly broad"); Lion Boulos 
v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that Supreme Co.urt's decisions in Harlow 
and Mitchell indicate "that qualified immunity does not shield government officials from all 
discovery but only from discovery which is either avoidable or overly broad"). 
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depends ultimately on how one characterizes the official's appeal. One inter-
pretation is that the immunity-from-suit prong supports finding three interests 
to be protected on interlocutory appeals: freedom from discovery, freedom 
from overly broad discovery, and freedom from an unnecessary trial. To 
support such an interpretation, one would need to broadly read Anderson's 
admonition against overly broad discovery. 
A better interpretation is to see the interest in being free from overly broad 
discovery as peripheral to the clear right to be free from discovery which, as 
Anderson noted, is a limited right. Under this interpretation, appellate review 
of the scope of discovery is not an "important" issue within the meaning of the 
collateral order doctrine. The official's concern is sufficiently distinguishable 
from the typical discovery concerns. Even though Harlow found civil rights 
actions to be significantly different from the typical lawsuits, once a district 
court has properly determined that discovery should proceed, the civil rights 
lawsuit resembles the ordinary lawsuit. In that situation, appellate courts 
should defer to the expertise of the trial courts in tailoring discovery. District 
courts should not lose control oflawsuits nor should officials flood appellate 
courts with multiple appeals from discovery rulings. 
Such appeals do not satisfy all three elements of the collateral order 
doctrine. Under the first element, finality may not be present because the 
course of discovery may require multiple interventions by the district court. 
The district court controls the course of discovery. The final judgment rule 
would militate against allowing such piecemeal appeals. 
Under the second element, such orders are separate from the merits. Yet, 
they could invite appellate courts to pore over depositions to determine the 
scope of discovery. Although the Court in Johnson permitted appellate courts 
to do so when district courts fail to specify the assumed facts in denying 
officials' summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, it did find 
this practice to be "cumbersome" and permissible under those limited circum-
stances.221 To allow such a practice with orders denying protection from 
discovery would unduly infringe upon the district court's expertise in trial 
management and the appellate court's role in resolving only fully developed 
issues. 
The third element, unreviewability, is more difficult. After discovery has 
concluded, any harm that the official suffered as a result of overly broad 
discovery is complete. The Harlow Court's transformation of the qualified 
immunity standard was to further the goal of preventing officials from answer-
ing unnecessary interrogatories and attending depositions. In short, the scope 
of discovery is unreviewable. Yet, even if courts were to review the district 
court's granting of discovery, such review is generally limited to an abuse of 
221. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,319 (1995). 
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discretion.222 This standard is built on the recognition of the trial court's 
expertise in processing cases. With this heightened standard for review, few 
appeals would be successful. 
AlthoughAnderson clearly expressed a concern about limiting discovery, 
interlocutory appeals should not lie from orders denying protection from 
discovery if the district court's order followed an order denying qualified 
immunity in a summary judgment motion before discovery. In the event that 
district courts permit unreasonably broad discovery, officials should invoke 
mandamus. 223 This procedure gives appellate courts discretion to hear such 
appeals without "simultaneously opening the door to review of similar ques-
tions in all future cases."224 
2. Discovery After Refusing to Decide Qualified Immunity Issue 
District courts also deny motions for protection from discovery for the 
stated reason that further factual developmentwill aid them in resolving a prior 
motion for summary judgment that raised qualified immunity.225 At this 
procedural stage, the district courts are making two rulings: one to deny 
protection from discovery and one to defer deciding whether the law was 
clearly established.226 The frrstruling raises the general issue of appealing from 
222. See, e.g., Grahamv. Gray, 827F.2d679, 681 (10thCir.l987)(statingthat"[a]lthough 
the decision on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment clearly 'turns on an issue 
of law,' ... a trial court's decision to allow or deny discovery is discretionary, and subject to 
review only for abuse of discretion") (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,530 (1985)). 
223. 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 217, at 132-33 (stating that "mandamus is used with 
some regularity"). 
224. Id. at 132. 
225. See, e.g., Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (lOth Cir. 1992) (stating that "an 
order is not immediately appealable ifit defers a decision on a qualified immunity claim because 
the claim turns, at least partially, on a fact question"); Andrev. Castor, 963 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 
(M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that appeal was frivolous because official sought protection from 
discovery before district court ruled on qualified immunity). 
226. See, e.g., Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 
1995) (determining that interlocutory appeal would lie from order denying protection from 
discovery when district court had not ruled on official's motion to dismiss). But see Whalen 
v. County of Fulton, 19 F.3d 828, 830 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that interlocutory appeal 
would not lie from order that denied qualified immunity in summary judgment "motion without 
prejudice to its renewal after further discovery"). 
Sometimes officials may struggle to distinguish between a district court's deferral of the 
qualified immunity decision from a district court's failure to respond to a motion for qualified 
immunity. See, e.g., Gosnell v. City ofTroy, 979 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
"because the order of the district court is entirely silent as to qualified immunity," the appellate 
court faced "jurisdictional limbo"). In Gosnell, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals properly 
held that it lacked jurisdiction from an order that did not decide that the law was clearly 
established. Id. at 1261. The court stated that when officials are not certain as to whether a 
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orders granting discovery.227 In sharp contrast, the second ruling draws the 
district court into the conflict between the primary goal of Harlow- to decide 
whether the law was clearly established before discovery228 - and the need for 
discovery in a particular case.229 
When considering motions for summary judgment before discovery, a 
district court's view of the facts depends upon how the official moves for 
summary judgment. If the official challenges the plaintiff's evidentiary suffi-
ciency, then discovery may be necessary. If discovery is necessary, then the 
district court would not be violatingHarlow' s goal, freedom from unnecessary 
discovery. It is possible for the district court to be wrong, however, in its 
determination that discovery is necessary. 
At that procedural stage, the district court has not made any determination 
as to the clarity of the law, the typical issue for interlocutory appeal. One 
means of getting review before discovery goes forward is for officials to adopt, 
arguendo, the plaintiff's version of the facts and ask the district court to 
determine the clarity of the law.230 If officials do not seek review in this 
manner, then perhaps discovery is necessary (or they have waived their right 
to an appeal).231 
If the district court refuses to decide the clarity oflaw question using the 
plaintiff's version of the facts and still orders discovery, then an interlocutory 
appeal will lie from the district court's subsequent order denying protection 
from discovery.232 In so ruling, a district court would be ignoring Harlow's 
district court has decided qualified immunity, they should file a "motion to reconsider or clarify." 
!d. at 1260. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217, 220-24. 
228. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). 
229. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987). 
230. See supra p. 35. 
231. SeeAusterOil&Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835F.2d597,601 (5thCir.1988)(findingwaiver 
when officials did not mention qualified immunity in "pretrial order, or in oral or written motions 
for directed verdict"); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 957 (6th Cir. 1987)(finding waiver because 
official did not timely objectto magistrate's report); Justice v. Town ofBlackwell, 820 F.2d 238, 
240-41 (7th Cir. 1987) (determining that interlocutory appeal would not lie when official waived 
qualified immunity defense by failing to timely raise it in his answer; in alternative, even if 
jurisdiction existed, determining that district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow 
official to amend answer). But see generally Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 449 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (finding no waiver where trial court made no determination offrivolousness or waiver, 
even though official"did not raise the qualified immunity defense until a full five years after the 
filing of the complaint, and days before the trial was scheduled to commence"). · 
232. See, e.g., Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (lOth Cir. 1992) (holding that 
appellate courts have jurisdiction from "orders postponing a decision" on motion to dismiss). 
But see Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 997 (5th Cir. 1995). In 
Wicks, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals added one limitation to appellate jurisdiction when 
a district court refuses to decide the clarity of law. /d. If the plaintiff's complaint meets a 
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limits on discovery. When such a postponement is for the stated purpose of 
allowing factual development, an interlocutory appeal should lie. 
This denial of protection raises the same issue as does a decision denying 
summary judgment before discovery. In the order denying protection, the 
district court implicitly rules against the official, implyingthatthere is no right 
to determine whether the law was clearly established before granting discovery. 
In an order denying qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment 
before discovery, the district court's ruling is explicit. Under these circum-
stances, a refusal to decide is tantamount to deciding that the immunity-from-
suit prong does not protect officials from unnecessary discovery. 
In taking an interlocutory appeal from a denial based on a refusal to 
decide, officials create a difficult issue for appellate courts to resolve. Appel-
late courts must decide whether they should resolve the question on appeal-
whether the law was clearly established - even though the district court has 
not first answered this question. In contrast to the typical appeal, the appellate 
court is unable to evaluate a district court's discussion of the qualified immu-
nity defense because it does not exist. The district court's refusal to decide 
thus resulted in no opinion for review. 
Some appellate courts decide the qualified immunity question, even though 
the district court did not address the question.233· Such an approach aids the 
timely disposition of the case. Yet, the appellate court might not have all the 
information before it as would a district court. The plaintiff may have not yet 
submitted affidavits to support the general allegations in the complaint. 
The better approach is for the appellate court to remand to the district 
court.234 Such an order would compel the district court to decide the issue of 
heightened pleading standard and discovery is necessary, then the district court need not rule 
on the qualified immunity standard. Id. The Wicks court clearly stated it was not imposing a 
"requirement that the district court must rule on a motion to dismiss prior to the allowance of 
discovery in all situations." Id. at 997 n.27. The Fifth Circuit's concern is valid, but instead 
of creating confusion as tq the need for district courts to rule on the qualified immunity issue, 
it should recognize that a denial of qualified immunity at one procedural stage does not mean 
that officials are barred from raising qualified immunity later. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 
116 S. Ct. 834, 839 (1996). If the discovery is clearly necessary and the officials appeal, district 
courts have the authority to certify such an appeal as frivolous. See infra text accompanying 
notes 257-62. A better interpretation of Wicks is that in determining that the plaintiff's allegations 
met the (erroneous) heightened pleading standard, the district court has ruled that the plaintiff's 
allegations state a violation of clearly established Jaw. This order would thus be appealable, if 
one interprets it as arising from a motion for summary judgment before discovery. See supra 
text accompanying notes 200-07. 
233. See, e.g., Gallegos v. City & County of Denver, 984 F.2d 358,362 (lOth Cir. 1993); 
Collins v. School Bd. ofDade County, 981 F.2d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 1993); Valientev Rivera, 
966 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1992). 
234. See, e.g., Francis v. Coughlin, 849 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1988)("When a district court 
fails to address an immunity defense, it is generally appropriate to remand the case with 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 43 
whether the law was clearly established. If the district court denied immunity, 
then an interlocutory appeal might lie again. One important tool available to 
district courts is the ability to certify an appeal as frivolous.235 Thus, if a 
district court certifies the second appeal as frivolous, a second appeal would 
not lie from the same question at the same procedural stage. Once discovery 
occurs, the next issue is whether an interlocutory appeal will lie froin a 
summary judgment order again denying qualified immunity. 
D. Orders for Summary Judgment After Discovery 
When district courts deny qualified immunity in a motion for summary 
judgment after discovery, the factual record is more developed. Under amotion 
for summary judgment raising qualified immunity, district courts consider 
whether there are disputed material facts and whether the official is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. The easy case for an interlocutory appeal is 
when the district court determines thatthere are no disputed material facts and 
denies qualified immunity. Such an appeal raises a single issue, for which 
appellate courts clearly have jurisdiction-did the district court err in determin-
ing that the law was clearly established. Yet, when district courts rule that 
material facts are disputed and deny qualified immunity, the question of 
whether an interlocutory appeal lies is significantly more difficult. Jurisdiction 
turns on whether appellate courts can address the clarity of law issue when 
material facts are disputed. 
In Behrens v. Pelletier, the Court offered two procedural solutions, one 
proper and the other an institutional nightmare. 236 Under the first procedural 
solution, appellate courts use the "assumed" facts, those that the district court 
explicitly stated in its order denying qualified immunity.237 The "assumed" 
facts are those that the district court found to be "sufficiently supported. "238 
The appellate court then asks whetherthose "assumed" facts indicate a violation 
of clearly established law. If they do not, then the official has qualified 
immunity. If they do, the official does not have immunity. 
instructions to rule on the matter."); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(stating that remand is appropriate even if appellate court decides qualified immunity defense 
as to other claims considered by district court); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F .2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that appellate court has jurisdiction but should remand for district court to first determine 
whether law was clearly established); Helton v. Clements, 787F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(same). See generally Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996) (remanding for court of appeals 
to determine whether law was clearly established in light of"assumed" facts). 
235. See infra text accompanying notes 251-74. 
236. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
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The second procedural solution applies when the district court does not 
specify what facts it assumed.239 Both Johnson and Behrens permit appellate 
courts to "undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts 
the district court ... assumed. "240 After reviewing the record, the appellate 
court articulates the presumed facts and decides the clearly established law 
question. 
The first procedural solution broadly protects the right to interlocutory 
appeals, without encroaching upon the district court's expertise in deciding 
whether facts are material and disputed. It avoids the problem of separability 
by using the evidence that the district court found sufficiently supported. It 
does not ask, however, the appellate court to determine what in fact happened. 
The second procedural solution is a serious encroachment of the trial 
court's function and the traditional practice of allowing the lower court to first 
decide an issue. The Johnson Court initially recognized the trial courts' 
expertise and the appellate courts' scarce resources. Yet, it, like Behrens, 
surprisingly create_d this bizarre solution. 
A sound solution is for appellate courts to use the facts the district court 
articulated in its order. Even this approach is more easily applied in th~orythan 
in practice. In using the articulated assumed facts, the appellate courts should 
not feel free to supplement them.241 To do so creates serious separability 
problems. With this more narrow review, courts are able to properly review 
the question of whether the law was clearly established in light of these 
assumed facts. Such review fulfills all three elements of the collateral order 
doctrine. 
When officials appeal from district court orders that fail to specify the 
assumed facts, a better practice is for the appellate court to either summarily 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or remand with direction to provide the "as-
sumed facts." Such an appeal cannot fulfill the separability requirement of the 
collateral order doctrine. When the case returns to the district court, the judge 
can specify the facts. An interlocutory appeal would then lie, unless the district 
court certifies the appeal as frivolous. 
In summary, interlocutory appeals lie from orders denying qualified 
immunity because the district court determined that the law was clearly 
established. Such orders can occur in motions for summary judgment before 
discovery if the officials adopt the plaintiff's version of the facts for the 
purpose of the motion. Orders denying qualified immunity can also occur as 
a result of prediscovery motions denying summary judgment in two situations: 
239. !d. 
240. !d. at 842 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995)). 
241. See supra note 8 (citing cases where federal courts of appeal have erroneously ignored 
district court's expertise in specifying assumed facts). 
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Either there are no material disputed facts or, if disputed facts do exist, the 
district court's order specifies assumed facts. Additionally, interlocutory 
appeals can lie from orders denying protection from discovery when the district 
court also refuses to decide whether the law was clearly established. 
Supplementing these jurisdictional complexities are appeals from orders 
declaring that a defendant is not an "official," but rather a private person not 
entitled to qualified immunity. Although these appeals do not raise the tradi-
tional clearly-established-law question for review, they nevertheless assert the 
same interests and are generally reviewable on appeal. 
E. Appeals from Orders Determining Defendant Was Not an "Official" 
As the states continue to engage in privatization of their official duties, 
such as allowing private corporations to run their prisons, appellate courts may 
be flooded with interlocutory appeals from orders declaring that a defendant 
was a "private" person not entitled to qualified immunity.242 Such orders do 
not address the central qualified immunity question on appeal- whether the 
law was clearly established. Instead they raise a different collateral issue -
whether the defendant was an official. Such orders can meetthe three elements 
of the collateral order doctrine depending upon how the defendants raise the 
issue procedtirally.243 
In Wyatt v. Cole244 and Richardson v. McKnight, 245 the Supreme Court 
never discussed whether an interlocutory appeal would lie from an order 
dismissing the qualified immunity defense because the defendant was a private 
actor. 246 In both cases, they addressed the merits of the appeal, not the question 
of jurisdiction. Wyatt held that private defendants cannot assert qualified 
immunity as a defense.247 It suggested that if another defense were available 
to them, it would only provide a defense to liability, not an immunity from 
suit.248 In Richardson, a sharply divided Court held that the defendants, prison 
guards who were employed by a private corporation, could not assert qualified 
242. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2102-03 (1997) (declaring that 
privately employed prison guards are not entitled to immunity provided to their governmental 
counterparts). 
243. In reviewing an order denying official status, appellate courts should again note that 
qualified immunity is a defense that can be first evaluated in a motion for summary judg-
ment before discovery, rather than in amotion to dismiss. See supra text accompanying notes 
177-209. 
244. 504 u.s. 158 (1992). 
245. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997). 
246. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1982); Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 
(1997). 
247. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168. 
248. !d. at 169. 
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immunity as a defense.249 In doing so, it explicitly left the door open for other 
private actors to assert immunity.250 
In light of Wyatt and Richardson, the question of whether the defendant 
is an official is tremendously important and difficult to decide. If the district 
court erroneously decides the status question, officials would lose their 
immunity from suit just as if the district court had determined that the law was 
clearly established. Such an order would subject the official to discovery and 
a trial. An interlocutory appeal from this type of order safeguards the same 
interests protected by the immunity-from-suit prong of the qualified immunity 
defense. As such, it raises an important issue that is final, separate from the 
merits, and unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 
Even when orders procedurally meet the elements of the collateral order 
doctrine, another judicially created doctrine can significantly limit appellate 
jurisdiction-the doctrine of frivolous appeals. An examination of the frivolity 
doctrine in qualified appeals reveals how courts can discern jurisdiction and 
further the purposes of the immunity-from-suit prong. 
F. Orders Declaring Appeal to Be Frivolous: 
The Dual Jurisdiction of the District and Appellate Courts 
The right to be free from discovery and a trial, created by the immunity-
from-suit prong, is similar to the right to be free from being twice prosecuted 
for the same offense, 251 a right protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 252 Both existto safeguard 
a defendant's right to be free from an unnecessary trial; qualified immunity 
also seeks to bar unnecessary discovery.253 As a result of this similarity, the 
Supreme Court254 and lower courts255 have applied the doctrine of frivolous 
249. Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at2107-08. 
250. Id. at 2108 (stating that "we have answered the immunity question narrowly, in the 
context in which it arose). The Court also noted that "[t]he case does not involve a private 
individual briefly associated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in 
an essential governmental activity, or acting under close official supervision." Id. 
251. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1996) (stating that interlocutory 
appeals raising qualified immunity and double jeopardy are "analogous"); Chuman v. Wright, 
960 F .2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that similarity justifies adoption ofjurisdictional rules 
of double jeopardy interlocutory appeals to qualified immunity appeals); Stewart v. Donges, 915 
F.2d 572, 577 n.5 {lOth Cir. 1990) (same); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 
1989) (same). 
252. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be "subjectforthe same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 159-70. 
254. See Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 840-41. 
255. See, e.g., Dickerson v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1994); Chuman, 960 
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appeals in double jeopardy cases to interlocutory appeals raising qualified 
immunity as a defense. 
The purpose of the frivolity doctrine is to allow discovery or trials to go 
forward because there is no colorable claim that an appeal would vindicate the 
asserted right, whether under the Double Jeopardy Clause256 or under the 
qualified immunity defense.257 This frivolity doctrine allows the appellate court 
and the district court to have jurisdiction simultaneously in some circum-
stances.258 To discern when the two courts simultaneously possess jurisdiction 
requires an examination of the traditional rule of jurisdiction in just one court 
and the need for a limited application of this "dualjurisdiction."259 
Under the traditional divestiture rule, once an official files a timely notice 
of appeal, a district court loses jurisdiction.260 The purposes of this judge-made 
rule are creating clarity in resolving who has jurisdiction and avoiding unneces-
sary duplication of efforts.261 The federal courts, using their supervisory 
powers, crafted an exception to the divestiture rule when they created the 
frivolity doctrine for interlocutory appeals.262 
In the context of interlocutory appeals asserting double jeopardy, the need 
for simultaneous jurisdiction emerged when a criminal defendant filed an 
interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of his double jeopardy 
motion.263 Under the traditional divestiture rule, the district court would lose 
F.2d at 105; Stewart, 915 F.2d at 577 n.5; Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339. 
256. See, e.g., United States v. LaMere, 951 F .2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1991 ); United States 
v. Bradley, 905 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 
987-88 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally United States v. Claiborne, 465 U.S. 1305, 1306 (1984) 
(declining review of dual jurisdiction doctrine as applied to claim of selective prosecution). 
257. See, e.g., Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992); Stewartv. Donges, 
915 F.2d 572,577 (lOth Cir. 1990); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989). 
258. See, e.g., Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1338-39 (finding dual jurisdiction for some qualified 
immunity interlocutory appeals); Dunbar, 611 F.2d at 988 (finding dual jurisdiction for some 
double jeopardy interlocutory appeals). For a discussion of what courts mean by "dual jurisdic-
tion," see infra text accompanying notes 259-7 4. 
259. See, e.g., LaMere, 951 F.2d at 1108 (stating that when criminal defendant files timely 
notice of appeal, district court "loses it power to proceed ... until the appeal is resolved" (quoting 
United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1984))). 
260. /d. (stating that divestiture rule is "a judge made rule originally devised in the context 
of civil appeals to avoid confusion or waste oftime resulting from having the same issues before 
two courts at the same time" (quoting Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 850)). 
261. /d. 
262. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 n.8 (1977) (urging federal appellate 
courts to use their supervisory powers to "establish summary procedures ... to weed out frivolous 
claims of former jeopardy"). 
263. See, e.g., United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980). In Dunbar, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly stated the need to modify the rule of jurisdiction in one 
court: 
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jurisdiction upon the criminal defendant's filing a notice of appeal.264 On 
appeal, the appellate court would consider whether the Double Jeopardy Clause 
barred the trial. Without the concept of dual jurisdiction, a district court could 
lose jurisdiction simply by the defendant's filing a frivolous interlocutory 
appeal. 265 If the district court acted without jurisdiction, any conviction would 
be void.266 
To allow the criminal trial court to proceed, appellate courts use their 
supervisory powers to create the notion of dual jurisdiction.267 Under the 
frivolity doctrine, a district court can retain jurisdiction if it conducts a hearing, 
writes an order, and specifies why the appeal is frivolous.268 Once this is done, 
the district court retains jurisdiction to proceed. 
In the context of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals, district 
courts similarly need to retain jurisdiction when appeals are frivolous. The 
Supreme Court in Behrens v. Pelletier appropriately adopted this doctrine as 
an important check upon multiple interlocutory appeals.269 The goal of the 
doctrine is to prevent officials from using unnecessary delay as a tactical 
advantage. 270 
The jurisdictional issues under the frivolity doctrine are not simple. To 
ascertain the district court's jurisdiction is easy, but to ascertain the appellate 
court's simultaneous jurisdiction is complex. The district court retains juris-
The divestiture of jurisdiction rule, applied in conjunction with [double jeopardy 
interlocutory appeals], would enable a criminal defendant to unilaterally obtain a 
trial continuance at any time prior to trial by merely filing a double jeopardy motion, 
however frivolous, and appealing the trial court's denial thereof. 
!d.; see also Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 851 (stating that "[a] ritualistic application of the divesti-
ture rule in the [double jeopardy] context conflicts with the public policy favoring rapid adjudica-
tion of criminal prosecutions" (quoting United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 
1980))). 
264. See, e.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 ( 1982) (stating 
that "[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance- it confers 
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects 
of the case involved in the appeal"). 
265. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 24 F.3d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
LaMere, 951 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1991). 
266. See, e.g., Dunbar, 611 F .2d at 986-87; see also Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 578 
n.8 (1Oth Cir. 1990) (voiding a civil trial because district court lacked jurisdiction by failing to 
issue a frivolity order). 
267. See, e.g.,LaMere, 951 F.2dat 1108; United Statesv. Bradley, 905 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 
(lith Cir. 1990); Dunbar, 611 F.2d at 987-88. 
268. See, e.g., Bradley, 905 F.2d at 1486; United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 936-37 
(lOth Cir. 1982). 
269. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1996). 
270. Id (stating that certifying appeals as frivolous enable district court to retain jurisdiction 
and minimizes disruption of ongoing proceedings). 
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diction by issuing its frivolity determination, 271 but it does not have the power 
to dismiss a notice of appeal. 272 Two views of appellate jurisdiction currently 
exist. The better view finds simultaneous jurisdiction only when officials seek 
a stay or mandamus.273 The other view finds appellate jurisdiction implicit in 
the notice of appeal, in which the official seeks review of the district court's 
order denying qualified immunity.274 
In the normal course of litigation, officials petition appellate courts for 
a stay of discovery or trial proceedings. The purpose of seeking the stay or 
mandamus is to protect the interests safeguarded by the immunity-from-suit 
prong ofthe qualified immunity defense. Motions for a stay or mandamus give 
the appellate court jurisdiction to resolve three issues: whether to stay discov-
ery or a trial;275 whether the appeal is frivolous;276 and if the appeal is not 
frivolous, whether the official has qualified immunity.277 
In addressing whether to grant a stay or issue mandamus, appellate courts 
may use two distinct modes of analysis. Under the first approach, they could 
271. See, e.g., Stewartv. Donges, 915 F.2d 572,577 (1Oth Cir. 1990)(statingthat presence 
of district court's written findings of frivolity creates a "bright jurisdictional line between the 
district court and the circuit court"). 
272. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 251, 252 {6th Cir. 1994) (stating that "district 
courts have a ministerial duty to forward to the proper court of appeals any notice of appeal which 
is filed" (citing FED. R. APP. P. 3(d))). 
273. See, e.g., Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[a]fter 
applying to the district court for a stay, the [officials'] should have applied to this court for a 
discretionary stay to prevent the district court from proceeding to trial"); Chan v. Wodnicki, 67 
F.3d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1995)(statingthatappellatejurisdiction is possible by official's "asking 
us to stay the trial"); Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 n.1 (1992); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 
F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a] party aggrieved by a finding of frivolousness 
or forfeiture [ ofthe qualified immunity defense] ... may seek a stay from this court, for we have 
jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction"); United States v. Farmer, 923 F .2d 1557, 1565 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (stating that appellate jurisdiction exists from order denying double jeopardy because 
criminal defendant filed "emergency motion to stay the retrial pending consideration of the 
interlocutory appeal"). 
274. See Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.3d 1473, 1476 {lOth Cir. 1993) (finding dual 
jurisdiction, after district court found appeal of one of four defendants to be frivolous and official 
did not seek stay). See generally Dickerson, 37 F.3d at 252 (stating appellate court always has 
jurisdiction to determine whether notice of appeal was valid, where official did not seek a stay 
from frivolity order). 
275. See infra text accompanying notes 278-79. 
276. See, e.g., Stewart, 915 F.2d at 578 n.6 (stating that after filing stay official may argue 
on appeal that interlocutory appeal is not frivolous). 
277. See, e.g., Chan v. Wodnicki,67F.2d 137, 139(7thCir.1995)(statingthat"[t]heclaim 
of immunity survives the denial of a stay"); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (1Oth Cir. 
1990) (stating that denial of stay "at the appellate level would ordinarily be without prejudice 
to the right of the defendant to argue the Jack of frivolousness of his interlocutory appeal when 
the matter is considered by the appellate courts on its merits"). 
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apply the traditional view that such relief is extraordinary and could generally 
deny it using summary procedures. 278 There are two advantages to this 
approach. First, it maintains the view that such remedies are extraordinary, 279 
furthering a consistent interpretation of stays and mandamus. Second, it reveals 
deference to the expertise of the district court. Presumably district courts are 
well situated to determine if on the eve of trial such appeals are merely dilatory. 
A contrasting and better approach is for the appellate court to use its 
determination of whether the appeal is frivolous to determine whether to grant 
the stay.280 If the district court were correct, then the appellate court could 
summarily dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In that case, because ofthe concept 
of dual jurisdiction, all district court proceedings conducted during the appeal 
would have been with jurisdiction. The theory for the dismissal is that an 
appeal from a frivolous order is a "nullity."281 
If, however, the appeal was not frivolous, then the appellate court should 
grant a stay to protect the officials' rights to be free from unnecessary discovery 
and trials. By granting a stay after finding no frivolity, the appellate court is 
implicitly recognizing that the remaining qualified immunity issue before it 
is no different from other interlocutory appeals asserting qualified immunity. 
Granting a stay would then eliminate the district court's dual jurisdiction. 
Even if an official does not seek a stay, one court has suggested that its 
jurisdiction arises from the denial of qualified immunity.282 Under this 
approach, both courts still have jurisdiction. The district court's jurisdiction 
comes from writing its frivolity determination and the appellate court's 
jurisdiction from the denial of qualified immunity.283 In short, a court always 
278. See, e.g., Stewart, 915 F.2d at 578 n.6 (stating that standards for seeking stay are "very 
high" and that officials may later on appeal argue without prejudice that their appeal was not 
frivolous). 
279. See, e.g., Chan, 67 F.3d at 139 (stating that denying this request for "extraordinary 
relief' does not "express any view of the merits of the underlying appeal"); Stewart, 915 F.2d 
at 578 n.6. 
280. See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1565 n.17 (11th Cir. 199l)(stating 
that "[t]his court denied the motion to stay thus ruling on the district court's finding of frivolous-
ness"). 
281. See, e.g., Chan, 67 F.3d at 139 (stating that "[a]frivolous appeal is a nullity ... ; it 
does not engage the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, just as a frivolous suit does not engage 
the jurisdiction of the district court"). 
282. Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (lOth Cir. 1993)(findingjurisdiction 
even though official did not seek stay, when considering interlocutory appeals of three other 
officials). 
283. See Langley, 987 F .2d at 14 77. In Langley, without analysis the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals discussed dual jurisdiction: 
Once a district court so certifies a qualified immunity appeal as frivolous and thus 
regains jurisdiction, that does not affect our jurisdiction. "Rather, both the district 
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has ''jurisdiction to determine [its] jurisdiction."284 During this type of an 
appeal, issues raised on interlocutory appeal can become moot.285 For example, 
the rights to be free from both discovery and a trial can become moot if the trial 
concludes before appellatereview.286 At that point, the only qualified-immunity 
issue remaining is the defense to liability, an issue that can be raised on appeal 
from the final judgment. 
Presumably, when officials do not seek a stay or mandamus, the appellate 
court's jurisdiction can arguably be similar to jurisdiction under the traditional 
view of stays and mandamus, where appellate courts often deny such relief. 
In those situations, the appellate courts do not stop the district court's proceed-
ings, and the appellate courts need to resolve whether the appeal is frivolous 
before deciding whether qualified immunity is available. If the appeal was 
frivolous, both courts would dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction. But if the courts 
did not fmd the appeal frivolous, then the option of staying proceedings is 
arguably lost. The only benefit of such an interlocutory appeal for officials 
is that an appellate court could resolve the immunity in the official's favor, 
ending the lawsuit. The problem with this view of dual jurisdiction is that it 
fails to recognize the significance of a district court's frivolity determination. 
Rarely, one hopes, would district courts be so misguided that they could not 
distinguish among a frivolous claim, a nonfrivolous claim to immunity later 
found debatable, and a nonfrivolous claim later found successful. 
In addition to resolving the issue of appellate jurisdiction after a district 
court issues a frivolity order, appellate courts may face the task of ascer-
tainingjurisdiction when district courts issue more than one frivolity determina-
tion. After each procedural motion, the official could erroneously attempt to 
take an interlocutory appeal. A district court may thus be faced with the 
task of issuing multiple frivolity determinations in a given case. Similarly, 
if the appellate court has not intervened, the proceedings in the district 
court may later suggest that an interlocutory appeal was proper. Thus, both 
district courts and appellate courts need to know when an interlocutory 
appeal will lie. 
court and court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to proceed. Thus the defendant 
is entitled ultimately to appellate review." 
/d. (quoting United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 937 (lOth Cir. 1982)). 
284. Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989). Yet, in Apostol, the Seventh 
Circuit required officials to seek a stay to invoke review of the denial of qualified immunity. 
/d. 
285. See, e.g., Chan v. Wodnicki, 67 F.3d 137, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that denial 
of stay was not on merits and thus it had jurisdiction to address qualified immunity, except for 
mootness caused by concluded trial). 
286. !d. 
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VL Conclusion 
An interlocutory appeal from an order denying qualified immunity is a 
powerful procedural tool for officials sued for violating a citizen's constitu-
tional rights. On appeal, officials may benefit from rulings that bar discovery, 
bar a trial, or bar recovery for their constitutional violations. Officials get this 
protection because qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability, but also 
an immunity from suit- one that officials can raise numerous times before the 
district court and sometimes during interlocutory appeals. As a result, injured 
citizens may never have their day in court. 
These potent appeals lie because of the judicially created collateral order 
doctrine, which allows appeals in some circumstances before final judgment. 
The purpose of the interlocutory appeal is to protect the interests safeguarded 
by the immunity-from-suit prong of the Harlow qualified immunity standard-
an official's freedom from unnecessary discovery and trial. In theory, qualified 
immunity benefits society. It allows officials to work instead ofbeing tied up 
in legal proceedings. In practice, courts have misconstrued qualified immunity, 
allowing it to infringe upon the proper roles of district courts, juries, and 
Congress. One important check on officials' undue delay of pretrial proceed-
ings and trials is the doctrine of frivolous appeals. 
Ascertaining when appellate jurisdiction lies for interlocutory appeals 
raising qualified immunity requires wading through the jurisdictional and 
procedural morass created by the Supreme Court. The Court's jurisprudence 
contains serious jurisdictional and procedural errors. First, it has rewritten the 
Rules of Civil Procedure to suggest that interlocutory appeals can lie from 
motions to dismiss. Second, it permits appellate courts to do the district courts' 
job. When the district court fails to specify the facts it assumed in denying a 
motion for summary judgment raising qualified immunity, it invites the 
appellate court to pore through depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits. The 
purpose of this extensive review of the record is for the appellate court to 
determine what facts the record required the district court to assume. Third, 
the Court failed to properly interpret the elements of the collateral order 
doctrine when it suggested that appeals lie from motions to dismiss and allowed 
appellate courts to make their own assessment of the assumed facts. The 
Court's discussion impermissibly expands appellate jurisdiction, an area for 
Congress to regulate. 
The courts of appeal have similarly viewed their jurisdiction with few 
limits. Some have granted appeals from motions to dismiss. Others have 
resolved material disputed facts. Still others have failed to give appropriate 
deference to the district court when supplementing the district court's assumed 
facts in summary judgment motions or in discarding the district court's assumed 
facts. 
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The confusion resulting from both the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and 
the lower courts' response is clear. A critical examination of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the collateral order doctrine, coupled with respect for the roles 
of trial courts, juries, and Congress supports the following jurisdictional and 
procedural observations. 
First, multiple interlocutory appeals are possible because officials can 
properly raise qualified immunity in motions for summary judgment both 
before discovery and after discovery. An interlocutory appeal may also lie from 
some orders denying protection from discovery. When a district court explic-
itly refuses to address whether the law was clearly established until discovery 
has occurred, an appeal will lie if the official invites the district court to resolve 
the clarity issue by using the plaintiffs version of the facts. Also appealable 
is an order in which the district court determines that the defendant was not 
an "official." Such a ruling means that the defendant cannot assert qualified 
immunity as a defense. Each of these orders is consistent with the traditional 
interpretations of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the collateral order doctrine. 
Second, interlocutory appeals do not lie from every order denying quali-
fied immunity. For example, an interlocutory appeal will not lie from a motion 
to dismiss, unless one is willing to have the Supreme Court judicially rewrite 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, a task appropriately assigned to Congress.287 If 
the appellate court were to grant qualified immunity, it would violate Rule 
8(a)(2), which authorizes notice pleading. Appeals from such motions to 
dismiss are also not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the basis for the judicially 
created collateral order doctrine. 
Third, when the district court determines that there are material disputed 
facts, appellate courts should examine "all of the conduct which the District 
Court deemed sufficiently supported" and ask whether the law was clearly 
established. By limiting itself to these assumed facts, the appellate court 
resolves an issue for which it has jurisdiction. Combing the appellate record 
for its own facts creates jurisdictional problems. The task of determining the 
assumed facts is perilously close to delving into the merits of the claim, creating 
a separability problem under the collateral order doctrine. 
Fourth, an interlocutory appeal can lie even after a district court issues 
an orderstatingthatthe appeal is frivolous. Under the concept of dualjurisdic-
tion, both the district court and the appellate court can simultaneously have 
jurisdiction in some circumstances. After denying qualified immunity, a district 
court can retain jurisdiction even though an official files a notice of appeal. 
The district court retains jurisdiction by writing an order explaining why the 
287. The rewriting of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a task assigned to the United States 
Supreme Court, on recommendation of the Judicial Conference, which relies on the Standing 
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appeal is frivolous. To avoid simultaneous jurisdiction, the official must apply 
to the appellate court for a stay or mandamus to stop proceedings in the district 
court. In deciding whether to grant the stay, appellate courts should first decide 
ifthe appeal is frivolous. If it is, then the appellate court should dismiss for 
a lack of jurisdiction. If it is not frivolous, the appellate court should grant a 
stay. After granting the stay, it would probe more deeply the qualified immu-
nity question that the district court thought was frivolous. 
The difficult task in determining whether to allow an interlocutory appeal 
from a denial of qualified immunity is one facing not only appellate courts but 
also district courts, the front line of civil rights litigation. Prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Behrens, many courts of appeals had a rule of allowing 
officials to take only one interlocutory appeal. Behrens' authorization will 
encourage officials to seek more than one interlocutory appeal. District courts 
will then have to determine which appeals are frivolous. In doing so, the 
doctrine of dual jurisdiction for frivolous appeals could be an incredibly 
important check on unnecessary interlocutory appeals. 
